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DISCLOSING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE POLICIES 
VICTORIA SCHWARTZ?
ABSTRACT
 Between Steve Jobs’ diagnosis of pancreatic cancer in 2003 and his death in 2011, Apple 
struggled to respect the privacy of its CEO while disclosing relevant information to its 
shareholders. The existing rules that govern corporate disclosure were of little help. They 
offer no mechanism for taking into account privacy considerations; nor do they provide any 
clear guidance regarding whether, when, and under what circumstances a corporation must 
disclose personal information about its executives. Existing privacy laws also fail to com-
prehensively address this problem. This legal void has created widespread uncertainty for 
executives, corporations, and shareholders. Scholars have also struggled to identify solu-
tions that appropriately account for both privacy and disclosure. Their attempts have been 
hindered by the difficulty of estimating the respective values of disclosure to investors and of 
privacy to executives, especially to the extent that the value of privacy varies widely across 
individuals and depends on the type of personal information.   
 This Article offers one solution for accounting for this privacy-disclosure problem. First, 
corporations and executives should contract for a disclosure policy that takes into considera-
tion the individual executive’s privacy preferences. The corporation should then be required 
to disclose the contracted-for disclosure policy to its shareholders. The use of a contractual 
menu approach would allow for the possibility of executives’ heterogeneous privacy prefer-
ences, while minimizing transaction and other costs of traditional default rules. At the same 
time, disclosure of the policy allows shareholders to indirectly exert influence on the corpora-
tion’s negotiations. In addition, the creation and disclosure of the disclosure policy increases 
certainty for all the parties involved.   
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I. INTRODUCTION
 When Apple CEO Steve Jobs was diagnosed with pancreatic can-
cer in 2003, after much agonizing, Apple’s board decided to say noth-
ing to its shareholders.1 And as Jobs’ health deteriorated, Apple con-
tinued to cite Jobs’ need for privacy, and offered little to no infor-
mation about his condition.2 By contrast, when Warren Buffett un-
derwent colon surgery in 2000, Berkshire Hathaway provided a de-
tailed press release before the surgery informing shareholders that 
Buffett expected to have the surgery and the circumstances that led 
to the surgery.3
 These salient health examples are not unique. Torn between re-
specting executive privacy and meeting obligations to shareholders, 
corporations lack guidance for whether and under what circumstanc-
es they should disclose personal information about their executives to 
their shareholders.4 And commentators, practitioners, and scholars 
continue to debate the doctrinal and positive question of when disclo-
sure is required under the existing legal system.5   
                                                                                                                  
 1. Cory Franklin, Does a CEO Deserve Privacy?, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 27,  
2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-27/news/ct-perspec-1027-ceo-20111027_1_ 
apple-shareholders-apple-board-apple-stock; Joe Nocera, Apple’s Culture of Secrecy, N.Y.
TIMES (July 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/business/26nocera.html? 
sq=&st=nyt&scp=170&pagewanted=all.
 2. Nocera, supra note 1.
 3. See ALICE SCHROEDER, THE SNOWBALL: WARREN BUFFETT AND THE BUSINESS OF 
LIFE 700-01 (2008). 
4. See infra Part II.B. 
5. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for 
Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
749, 752-59 (2007) ( “[T]he gap-filling rules may require public disclosure of executives’ 
personal facts.” Under the antifraud rules “a court may find that it is substantially likely 
that a reasonable investor would consider certain personal facts important in making an 
investment decision relating to the corporation’s securities. . . . [or] as a significant altera-
tion of the total mix of available information.” (emphasis added)); Alexis Brown Stokes, 
An Apple a Day Keeps Shareholder Suits at Bay: An Examination of a Corporate Officer’s 
Legal Duty to Disclose Health Problems to Shareholders, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 303, 
310 (2011) (recognizing that there is “uncertainty over whether and when an executive’s 
medical condition is ‘material’ to the company”); Chris Dolmetsch & Peter Burrows, Apple 
May Not Need to Disclosure Details of Jobs Medical Leave, Lawyers Say, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 
18, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-18/apple-s-disclosure-of-steve-jobs-
medical-leave-is-sufficient-lawyers-say.html; Nocera, supra note 1.    
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 This Article addresses the related prescriptive question of when a 
corporation should be required to disclose personal information about 
its executives to its shareholders in light of a privacy-disclosure prob-
lem—conflicting interests in executive privacy and shareholder dis-
closure pulling in opposing policy directions. This privacy-disclosure 
problem exists at the intersection of two Brandeisian-inspired legal 
ideas. Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s 1890 article “The Right 
to Privacy,” arguing for legal recognition of a right to privacy,6 is 
widely considered the founding architecture for privacy law and 
scholarship.7 At the same time, Brandeis’ famous quotation that 
“[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial 
diseases” and that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman,”8 is commonly recognized 
in the corporate disclosure literature as part of the founding legal 
theory for the value of disclosure, which influenced thinking about 
corporate disclosure regimes.9   
 The privacy-disclosure problem occurs as the result of a tension 
between two sets of competing interests. On the one hand, share-
holders have a legitimate interest in disclosure of personal infor-
mation about an executive that either impacts the ability of the exec-
utive to currently perform his or her duties, or is likely to impact the 
executive’s ability to perform his or her duties in the future. On the 
other hand, executives have a legitimate privacy interest in their per-
sonal information. Additionally, evidence suggests that individual pri-
vacy preferences are heterogeneous.10 The resulting difficulty in de-
termining the strengths, valuations, and distribution of privacy prefer-
ences makes developing a solution that correctly accounts for the com-
peting privacy and disclosure interests particularly challenging.   
                                                                                                                  
6. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).  
7. See, e.g., James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. 
Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 877 (1979) 
(noting the “near unanimity among courts and commentators that the Warren-Brandeis 
conceptualization created the structural and jurisprudential foundation of the tort of inva-
sion of privacy”); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and 
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1990).  
8. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).  
9. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Cor-
porate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1212-15 (1999) (describing Brandeis’ 
role as an “advocate of disclosure” and his influence on the players involved in writing the  
Securities Act).   
 10. See Il-Horn Hann et al., The Value of Online Information Privacy: An  
Empirical Investigation 3 (Oct. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://regulation2point0.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/04/php2b.pdf; Alan F. 
Westin, “Whatever Works”: The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Regulation and  
Self-Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-and-privacy (last visited May 14, 
2013); infra Part II.A. 
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 Furthermore, the privacy-disclosure problem extends beyond the 
disclosure of health information context, although that is the situa-
tion that often arises in the news and therefore in the public con-
sciousness. Analogous problems involving tensions between privacy 
and disclosure may be triggered by various types of personal infor-
mation—including a messy divorce, extramarital affairs, legal diffi-
culties, addictions, and various problems with a child—all of which 
may impact the executive’s performance in some manner.   
 This Article offers one possible solution for addressing the privacy-
disclosure problem.11 Under this proposal, individual corporations 
would contract with their high-level executives to determine the pri-
vacy disclosure policy that would apply to that executive’s personal 
information in light of that executive’s privacy preferences. The cor-
poration would then be required to disclose that negotiated disclosure 
policy to its shareholders. By harnessing market forces, this solution 
accounts for the differences in individual privacy preferences, while 
providing a mechanism to respect both sets of competing interests. 
This solution allows executives to negotiate a disclosure policy that 
matches their personal privacy preferences. At the same time, the 
disclosure of that negotiated disclosure policy would still provide  
additional decisionmaking information to shareholders to use in their  
investment decisions. 
 The Article develops these ideas in four parts. Part II offers a the-
oretical account of the competing interests at stake in the problem 
building upon both the existing privacy and disclosure literatures. It 
then addresses the evidence suggesting the existence of heterogene-
ous privacy preferences and the additional challenges such heteroge-
neity creates. Part II also identifies the insufficiencies of existing le-
gal regimes in dealing with these competing interests and the result-
ing real world uncertainty in the corporate world. Part III introduces 
the details of the proposed solution and explains the benefits of using 
a contract menu approach. Part IV considers the applicability of the 
                                                                                                                  
 11. Others have previously discussed this privacy-disclosure problem in different con-
texts. See Patricia Sánchez Abril & Ann M. Olazábal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate Disclo-
sure at the Intersection of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1545, 1581-96 
(2010) (discussing disclosure obligations under SEC regulations and federal antifraud 
laws); Heminway, supra note 5, at 789-802 (2007) (recommending reforms relating to dis-
closure of personal information about executives); Allan Horwich, When the Corporate Lu-
minary Becomes Seriously Ill: When Is a Corporation Obligated to Disclose That Illness and 
Should the Securities and Exchange Commission Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 827, 833-62 (2009) (addressing primarily the descriptive question of 
what the law currently requires); Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 911, 951-70 (2012) [hereinafter Lin, Executive] (proposing importing the trade se-
cret regime as a useful theoretical framework for treatment of executive disclosures); Tom 
C.W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company 
Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 409-16 (2009) [hereinafter Lin, Undressing the CEO]
(offering a model for disclosure of private executive information). 
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proposed solution to other areas of the law including consumer priva-
cy and the disclosure of information about politicians and candidates 
for office, and explains how examining those contexts reinforces that 
this solution is specifically tailored to the particular problem of cor-
porate executives. Part V concludes.    
II. TENSION BETWEEN PRIVACY AND DISCLOSURE
 In deciding whether corporations should have to disclose personal 
information about corporate executives to the corporation’s share-
holders, policymakers must account for privacy and disclosure inter-
ests pulling in competing directions. The shareholder interests pull in 
the direction of more disclosure, whereas the executive privacy inter-
ests pull in the direction of less. This section builds on the existing 
corporate disclosure and privacy literatures to identify these compet-
ing interests and explain why they are triggered in the context of this 
particular problem. It then turns to a discussion of the legal status 
quo, with regard to both the corporate disclosure rules and various 
privacy laws, in order to explain the shortcomings of this patchwork 
of laws for thinking about the problem. The status quo neither ac-
counts for both sets of competing interests nor for the added difficulty 
posed by evidence of heterogeneity in privacy preferences. Conse-
quently, executives, shareholders, and corporations all currently op-
erate within a regime of uncertainty.  
A.   The Disclosure Interest 
 The securities regulatory regime in the United States is unques-
tionably a disclosure regime. Furthermore, it seems fair to assume 
that the existing overall disclosure regime is likely to remain intact 
for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, in order to better appreciate 
the specific disclosure interest in the disclosure of personal executive 
information, it is helpful to briefly describe the rationales for the 
overall disclosure system, while recognizing the long-lasting debate 
regarding the overall merits of such a regime. Only then is it possible 
to identify the theory under which there is a legitimate interest in 
the disclosure of personal information about executives. To be clear, 
the question at this point in the analysis is whether there is an inter-
est in, or a value to, disclosure itself. This is distinct from the ques-
tion of whether disclosure makes sense as a policy; that question in-
volves both the consideration of costs and benefits of a disclosure pol-
icy as well as comparisons to alternative policy options.        
 The legal, economic, accounting, and finance literatures address-
ing disclosure have not identified a single comprehensive theory of 
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disclosure.12 Although they draw lines in different ways, scholars de-
fending the existing system of corporate disclosure have identified its 
underlying rationale as some combination of intersecting justifica-
tions: (1) preventing financial manipulation/fraud because “sunlight 
is said to be the best of disinfectants”; (2) providing investors with 
enough information to enable them to arrive at their own rational 
decisions; (3) fairness/equality: allowing all investors, big and small, 
insiders and outsiders, equal access to relevant information; (4) re-
storing the confidence of investors in the stock market; and (5) caus-
ing stock prices to better reflect underlying firm value and therefore 
enhance market accuracy.13 At the same time, critics have challenged 
these justifications on numerous theoretical14 and empirical grounds.15
                                                                                                                  
 12. See, e.g., Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 98 (2001).  
 13. I draw these lines slightly different from others, but draw upon their categories. 
See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983) (describing the benefits of mandatory disclosure as (1) preventing 
issuers from concealing or misrepresenting information material to investment decisions; 
(2) preventing underwriting costs and insiders’ salaries and perquisites from becoming 
excessive; (3) increasing “public confidence” in the markets; (4) supplementing suboptimal 
disclosure under state law and private associations; and (5) supplementing suboptimal 
disclosure under civil and criminal actions); see also Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic 
Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 479-80, 
480 n.25 (2007) (offering three categories and suggesting that Seligman’s categories can be 
collapsed into his three: (1) investors will make better investment decisions; (2) stock prices 
will better reflect underlying firm value thereby enhancing market accuracy; and (3) fraud 
will be deterred). 
 14. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 692-96 (1984); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory 
and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 770-72 (1995). 
 15. In 1964, George Stigler provided the first systematic criticism of corporate disclo-
sure requirements. George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. BUS.
117 (1964). Among his many arguments, Stigler attempted to empirically determine 
whether investors in new stock issues had benefitted from mandatory disclosure require-
ments. See id. at 120. Stigler concluded that the mandatory disclosure requirements “had 
no important effect on the quality of new securities sold to the public.” Id. at 124.   
 Almost immediately, Irwin Friend and Edward Herman challenged the accuracy of 
Stigler’s data, as well as the conclusions he had drawn from his findings. See Irwin Friend 
& Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. BUS. 382 (1964). Friend 
and Herman found that correcting for these deficiencies confirmed the superiority of post-
S.E.C. performance. See id. at 391-99. This led to another round of exchanges between 
Stigler and his critics. See George J. Stigler, Comment, 37 J. BUS. 414 (1964) (defending his 
conclusions, while acknowledging errors in the original data); Irwin Friend & Edward S. 
Herman, Professor Stigler on Securities Regulation: A Further Comment, 38 J. BUS. 106 
(1965) (claiming that even with Stigler’s revisions, the evidence still strongly favors superi-
or new issue performance in the post-S.E.C. period).   
 A decade later, George Benston advanced three arguments for concluding that man-
datory disclosure was unnecessary: (1) a historical critique: he found little evidence of 
fraud or misrepresentation prior to 1933; (2) a necessity critique: corporate voluntary dis-
closures prior to 1934 provided investors with adequate material financial information to 
make informed investment decisions; and (3) an empirical critique based on tests demon-
strating that the corporate disclosures compelled by the SEC were neither timely nor ma-
terial to investors. George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Eval-
uation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973). Like Stigler’s, 
Benston’s studies and the conclusions he drew from them have drawn extensive criticisms. 
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Relatedly, theoretical economic models suggest that investors value 
disclosure requirements because such disclosure causes managers to 
better prioritize maximizing shareholder value, and some empirical 
evidence supports this conclusion.16 The evidence from empirical and 
theoretical attempts to demonstrate or disprove the effectiveness of 
disclosure remains mixed,17 and a clear answer remains elusive.18
 Despite this uncertainty, consistent with the majority view as well 
as with the existing disclosure regime, this Article assumes that 
there is some value to shareholders from the disclosure of certain 
types of relevant information. At the most basic level, shareholders 
value the disclosure of relevant information because shareholders 
always want to be able to sell their stock for the highest price possi-
ble.19 Their ability to command the highest possible price relies on a 
flow of believable information from the corporation, which prevents 
potential buyers from reducing their bid prices because they assume 
the worst.20 Shareholders want positive information to be disclosed in 
order to raise the stock price directly. Shareholders want negative 
information to be disclosed in order to increase the believability of 
the flow of information, and because without the disclosure of bad 
information, buyers may assume that silence is evidence of cata-
strophic information, thus reducing the share price.        
                                                                                                                  
See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Randolph Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: 
Comment, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 467, 467-68 (1975) (noting that the conclusions Benston 
“draws from his analysis seem faulty”); Seligman, supra note 13, at 14-18 (criticizing 
Benston’s historical critique as being based on an incomplete search of the literature; his 
voluntary disclosure argument as based on an incomplete sample and failing to support his 
overall conclusions; his empirical critique as based on a faulty tests, which have been heav-
ily criticized for both study design and interpretation of results; and all of his critiques as 
objectionable because they ignore historical evidence supporting disclosure).          
 16. See Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclo-
sure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 2006 Q. J. ECON. 399, 403.  
 17. See, e.g., Greenstone, Oyer & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 16, at 446-47 (finding 
evidence that investors valued the additional disclosure requirements in the 1964 Securi-
ties Acts Amendments); Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the 
Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613, 624-50 (1981); Rafael La Porta et al., 
What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 27-28 (2006) (concluding that mandatory 
disclosure rules improve stock market performance); Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 
Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON.
REV. 295, 313 (1989) (finding a benefit from mandatory disclosure on unseasoned, non-
NYSE-traded firms, but not seasoned NYSE-traded firms). See also Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 14, at 672 (concluding that “neither the supporters nor the opponents of the 
fraud and disclosure rules have made a very good case.”).   
 18. Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 411-12 (2004) (noting that existing “empirical economic studies 
provide no more than weak support for mandatory disclosure” and that “the case for man-
datory disclosure remains indeterminate”); See Manne, supra note 13, at 474 n.3 (pointing 
out that “evidence of the efficacy of mandatory disclosure is also ambiguous”).  
 19. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 684. 
 20. Id.
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 Therefore, the key question is why personal information about ex-
ecutives constitutes the sort of relevant information whose disclosure 
shareholders value. Some scholars have attempted to minimize the 
legitimacy of the interest in personal information about executives as 
an example of celebrity-fascination, and therefore not something that 
society or lawmakers should prioritize.21 While celebrity-fascination 
may be a portion of the picture, other under-theorized explanations 
exist for why shareholders might want to know personal information  
about executives.   
 First, shareholders might legitimately care about personal infor-
mation regarding executives, which provides some insight into the 
ability of the executive to do his or her job. This category may be di-
vided into concerns about an executive’s ability to currently perform 
the job, and concerns about the executive’s ability to stay on the job.  
 In the first scenario, shareholders might care about personal in-
formation that in some way may impact the ability of the executive to 
do his or her job. In this scenario, the personal fact is not signaling to 
the shareholder that the executive will leave the current role, but 
rather that the executive’s effectiveness in that role is impacted per-
haps because the personal fact represents some sort of distraction or 
other inability to devote the executive’s typical time, energy, or focus 
to the company. This scrutiny of the ability of the executive to do his 
or her job does not rely on an assumption that the executive single-
handedly affects corporate performance.22 The executive is not strict-
ly speaking “indispensable,” and there is probably, as others have 
argued, an overly exaggerated cult of the CEO.23 It is not, however, 
necessary for the executive to single-handedly affect corporate per-
formance for information about the executive to be relevant to the 
shareholder, because it can impact the executive’s performance and 
therefore the performance of the company.   
 Various personal facts about the executive might trigger this con-
cern about the executive’s ability to perform his or her job. For exam-
ple, an executive who is in the middle of a nasty divorce might find 
the divorce to be a significant distraction from his or her duties. Simi-
larly, non-terminal health issues might impact the ability of an exec-
utive to do his or her job, even if shy of requiring the executive to ac-
tually leave the job. For example, a particular health issue may cause 
time away from the job because of time required to attend doctor ap-
pointments or to deal with treatment. Alternatively, various health 
issues may involve symptoms that impact job performance, such as 
severe headaches, physical weakness, or various mental health issues.   
                                                                                                                  
 21. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1547-50. 
 22. But see id. at 1602-03 (identifying this as a fallacy by those who believe that cor-
porate information can impact the company). 
 23. See id.
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 In some situations, such as the death of a family member, empiri-
cal evidence exists that is at least consistent with this distraction 
theory. For example, finance scholars at NYU’s Stern School of Busi-
ness found that on average the profitability of a company, as meas-
ured by operating return on assets, fell by roughly 2.4 percentage 
points in the two years after the death of a CEO’s child than in the 
two previous years.24 There was also a drop in the company’s return 
on assets after the death of a CEO’s parent25 (although no statistical-
ly significant change after the death of a mother-in-law).26   
 The second scenario involves personal information that share-
holders would consider relevant because it provides some insight re-
garding the executive’s ability to retain the job. A few versions of this 
theory are plausible. First, shareholders may believe that a particu-
lar executive is especially good at his or her job, and there is a con-
cern about losing that executive because the successor may not be 
equally effective. Second, regardless of what shareholders believe 
about a particular executive, there may be a belief that transitions 
are necessarily hard on a company, so the very fact of an upcoming 
transition is relevant to the shareholder. This theory is consistent 
with the prominence of developing corporate succession plans within 
the corporate governance literature.27 Finally, shareholders may be-
lieve that a particular executive is subpar, but due to various capture 
and other issues, that the board is unlikely to remove that executive. 
In that final scenario, shareholders would look at the personal infor-
mation that suggests that the executive is likely to leave his or her 
position as a positive input. 
 This theory does not rely on an assumption that a publicly traded 
company is “likely to become extinguished or suffer irreparable long-
term harm if its corporate figurehead dies or falls in infamy.”28 In ac-
tuality, very little of what a corporation does single-handedly affects 
corporate performance, or causes the company to become extin-
guished or suffer irreparable harm. Instead, corporate performance is 
a complex result of numerous relevant factors, and the ability of the 
executive to stay on the job constitutes one such relevant factor.   
                                                                                                                  
 24. Morten Bennedsenol, Francisco Pérez-González & Daniel Wolfenzon, Do CEOs 
Matter? 15 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Business 
School), available at http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/3177/ 
valueceos.pdf (using data from Denmark).  
 25. Id. at 19. 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 351, 379-80 (2011) (pointing out the importance of succession plans to a com-
pany’s stability and success); Stokes, supra note 5, at 323 (arguing that good corporate gov-
ernance principles would require every public company to develop a clear succession plan).   
 28. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1604 (suggesting that this is a second fallacy 
of the belief that executive information can impact company performance). 
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 A number of personal facts could impact the executive’s ability to 
stay on the job, and therefore be relevant under this theory. The most 
obvious example is a serious or even terminal illness as was the case 
with Steve Jobs. Other examples include criminal legal problems 
(putting aside those directly related to the corporation), especially 
those that can result in jail time and the resulting loss of the services 
of the executive. Some empirical evidence supports this theory that 
the company’s performance can be impacted by the loss of an execu-
tive as well.29
 In addition to personal information revealing something about the 
ability of the executive to do or stay in his or her job, shareholders 
might also care about executive personal facts based on a belief that 
the facts reveal information about the executive’s integrity or values. 
Just as others have argued that information about a corporation’s 
social impact contains value given the existence of social investors 
who are concerned with the social and environmental effects of corpo-
rate conduct,30 similarly, investors might rationally be concerned 
with personal information revealing something about an executive’s 
integrity or values that is of concern to some shareholders. The in-
formation that falls within this category bears close resemblance to 
the sort of information the public has found relevant with regard to 
politicians and includes things like extramarital affairs.   
 Some scholars criticize this theory of disclosure by pointing out 
that this information is at best anecdotal evidence of the executive’s 
integrity and “may have no bearing at all.”31 Certainly any infor-
mation that has “no bearing at all” on either ability or integrity/value 
of the executive has no disclosure interest. The remaining personal 
information, however, even if merely anecdotal, remains relevant, 
and the only question is a matter of degree. Although the anecdotal 
nature of the evidence might suggest that “formal disclosure of such 
information might on balance be more harmful than beneficial to  
investors,”32 that conclusion skips ahead to the next step of the anal-
ysis where costs and benefits are balanced. Again, at this point the 
question is not whether all such information ought to be disclosed, 
but rather whether there is a theory under which investors benefit 
from such disclosure.   
 Some personal facts may fall into more than one theory of disclo-
sure. For example, whereas information about an executive’s unlaw-
ful activities may be relevant because the executive may go to jail, or 
                                                                                                                  
 29. Jesus M. Salas, Entrenchment, Governance, and the Stock Price Reaction to Sud-
den Executive Deaths, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 656, 657 (2010) (reviewing the executive 
deaths literature that has found negative reactions to sudden executive deaths). 
 30. See Williams, supra note 9, at 1273-88, 1293-96. 
 31. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1600.   
 32. Id.
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be distracted from his or her duties, the same information might also 
be relevant because it tells shareholders something about that execu-
tive’s values or integrity. Other personal facts may not fall into any 
theory of beneficial disclosure. For those facts, the privacy-disclosure 
problem set out by this Article does not apply, as there is no legitimate 
disclosure interest in conflict with the executive’s privacy interest.   
 Although most of the media publicity has involved executives who 
have achieved a certain level of personal fame, the same theories 
identified for why shareholders would care about executives’ personal 
information apply to senior level executives who are less notorious. 
Although certainly not every corporate executive is as vital to a com-
pany as Steve Jobs or Warren Buffett, the difference is one of degree 
rather than of kind. The salaries commanded by senior level execu-
tives33 suggest that corporations and shareholders believe that they 
are valuable to the company and accordingly that their performances 
matter. Hence it is logical that distractions from that performance 
would also matter. In fact, it may be the case that executives at pub-
lically traded companies that are smaller may matter even more, be-
cause in the smaller companies the executive holds more specific 
knowledge about all aspects of the company’s performance.       
B.   The Privacy Interest 
 In addition to the typical costs recognized in the corporate litera-
ture as inherent whenever there is disclosure, the question of wheth-
er to disclose the personal information of executives requires consid-
eration of an additional cost—namely interference with the execu-
tives’ privacy interests. This section addresses privacy interests as a 
potential cost of a disclosure policy, or something to be considered as 
a competing consideration against the disclosure interest discussed
above. This section does not have in mind a legal privacy right, which 
would inherently prevent disclosure.34 The normative and policy 
problem considered in this Article is triggered not only when disclo-
sure impinges upon legal privacy rights, but also whenever disclosure 
requires impinging upon a privacy interest, regardless of whether 
                                                                                                                  
 33. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2013) (describing and lamenting the rise of executive compen-
sation); David I. Walker, Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation (And 
Other Corporate Agency Costs), 57 VILL. L. REV. 653, 658-61 (2012) (providing various sta-
tistics for the high levels of executive pay). 
 34. See Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 1, 3-4 (Ferdinand David Schoe-
man ed., 1984) (recognizing that the issue of loss of privacy should be disentangled from 
the question of infringement upon a right to privacy). 
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that interest has already been legally recognized as a constitutional, 
statutory, or common law privacy right.35     
1.   Accounts of the Value of Privacy 
 Just as scholars have not reached a consensus account of the value 
of disclosure, similarly there are numerous accounts of the value of 
privacy. Overall, traditional privacy scholarship across disciplines 
identified two main clusters of explanations for why privacy is im-
portant and valuable to society:36 (1) “privacy is a key component in 
the more general regard for human dignity,” which includes appeals 
to “such conditions as moral integrity, individuality consciousness of 
oneself as a being with moral character and worth, and consciousness 
of oneself as a being with a point of view, searching for meaning in 
life”; and (2) privacy is essential to interpersonal relationships, which 
includes an “understanding of ourselves as social beings with varying 
kinds of relationships, each in its way important to a meaningful 
life.”37 Additionally, the developing economics of privacy literature 
addresses the value of privacy with regard to economic terms.     
 One reason for taking into account the privacy of executives is 
that there is a relationship between respect for privacy and respect 
for individual dignity more generally. Warren and Brandeis’ famous 
1890 article “The Right to Privacy” contains early hints of this idea.38
Warren and Brandeis defended the importance of protecting privacy 
in reference to other values already deemed worth protecting, such as 
the individual’s right to be left alone and the respect due an individ-
ual’s inviolate personality.39 They suggested that these values relate 
to a person’s self-estimate and others’ estimates of that person’s feel-
                                                                                                                  
 35. By contrast, other scholars have focused on a conflict with privacy rights rather 
than interests. See Heminway, supra note 5, at 771-72 (criticizing the existing disclosure 
regime for creating tension with the right to privacy); Lin, Undressing the CEO, supra note 
11, at 423-25 (dismissing concerns about individual privacy rights); Stokes, supra note 5, at 
311-13 (examining the right to privacy rather than an interest in privacy). 
 36. While this discussion of privacy is necessarily rooted in American culture and 
society, scholars have argued that privacy is a more universal value. For example, in “The 
Origins of Modern Claims to Privacy,” Alan Westin concluded that although the specific 
forms it may take may differ, privacy appears to be a cultural value across all human socie-
ties. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 12-13 (1967). Similarly, Robert Murphy ar-
gues in his essay “Social Distance and the Veil” that privacy is recognized and institution-
alized in all societies, and is essential to the maintenance of both social relationships and 
the sense of self. Robert F. Murphy, Social Distance and the Veil, in PHILOSOPHICAL DI-
MENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 34, at 34-35 (arguing that the modern 
understanding of the private realm originated in classical Greek times as those aspects of 
life activities that people shared with lesser beings, not as those necessary for the flourish-
ing of uniquely human activities). 
 37. Schoeman, supra note 34, at 8 (classifying the various value of privacy literature 
as fundamentally falling into these two categories). 
 38. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 196.  
 39. Id. at 205-07. 
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ings. By their account, society and the law ought to recognize the 
moral and spiritual integrity of individuals.40    
 Subsequently, Edward Bloustein expanded upon the idea of invio-
late personality introduced by Warren and Brandeis as central to the 
role of privacy.41 Bloustein included other values such as individual 
dignity and integrity, personal uniqueness, and personal autonomy,42
and argued that it is respect for these values, which underlies giving 
individuals the right to determine to whom their thoughts, emotions, 
sentiments, and tangible products are communicated. Bloustein ar-
gued that privacy is essential to an individual’s uniqueness, autono-
my, and sense of moral personality.43 Similarly, Stanley Benn argued 
that something basic to the notion of respect for persons underlies 
society’s desire to respect a person’s choice to act in private.44 Benn 
suggested that society’s privacy ideals are tightly linked to ideals 
about life and character.45 Finally, Jeffrey Reiman defended privacy 
in terms of individualistic moral considerations, as “a social ritual by 
means of which an individual’s moral title to his own existence is con-
ferred.”46 In this view, privacy is an essential part of a social practice 
by which a society communicates to the individual that this existence 
is rightfully his or her own.47 Without such a practice, Reiman theo-
rized that a person’s very sense of self as something morally distinc-
tive could not develop.48 Included in Reiman’s vision of moral auton-
omy and personhood is the ability to determine what about our 
thoughts and body is experienced by others.49
 A second reason to take into account the privacy preferences of 
executives is that privacy plays a role in assisting individuals to 
maintain interpersonal relationships that are the key to a function-
ing society. Charles Fried explained that the fundamental capacity to 
form important, intimate relationships of love, friendship, and trust 
requires the ability to choose when to relinquish aspects of one’s inner 
self to another.50   
                                                                                                                  
 40. Other scholars disagreed and contended that the interest in privacy can be re-
duced to reputation, emotional tranquility, and proprietary gain, rather than something 
unique to privacy. See Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by “Right to Privacy”?, 4 S.D. L.
REV. 1, 7-12 (1959); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406-07 (1960).  
 41. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).  
 42. Id. at 1002-03.    
 43. Id.
 44. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 34, at 223, 231-32. 
 45. Id. at 235-43. 
 46. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26,  
39 (1975). 
 47. Id. at 39, 43. 
 48. Id. at 39. 
 49. Id. at 42. 
 50. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 480 (1968).  
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 Fried’s theory of privacy formed the foundation for other interper-
sonal relationship-based views of privacy.51 James Rachels general-
ized Fried’s position, noting that not only can privacy be the way to 
privilege intimate relationships, but privacy is also central to a per-
son’s ability to maintain varying kinds of relationships regardless of 
intimacy.52 Similarly, Robert Gerstein argued that intimacy could not 
occur without privacy.53 Gerstein explained that intimate relationships 
require parties to behave as what he called “participants,” which re-
quires a sense of abandon that is not possible absent privacy.54 Privacy 
is also essential to provide individuals with the ability to form inde-
pendent judgments about social norms.55 As part of an otherwise di-
verse account of privacy, Ruth Gavison noted that privacy allows for 
important interactions among people with different points of view 
without the need to address areas of disagreement.56 Privacy allows 
individuals the emotional and intellectual space to thoughtfully con-
sider troubling ideas without social pressure.57
 As a multi-disciplinary issue, until this point the discussion of pri-
vacy has been in the language of values and philosophical, sociologi-
cal, and psychological interests. While these interests are conceptual-
ly legitimate, when the opposing interest is economic, such as the 
shareholder interest in the disclosure of information, it can be diffi-
cult to know how to compare these far more amorphous discussions of 
privacy interests. For this reason, the economics of privacy literature 
can add a useful addition to consider the tradeoffs required in policies  
addressing privacy.58   
 Led by Richard Posner, early economic treatments of privacy in 
the late 1970s to early 1980s questioned the value of privacy and con-
tended that markets for personal information would work adequately 
without any regulation.59 Concerned with overregulation in attempt-
ing to protect privacy, this early literature attacked privacy as not 
social wealth maximizing. For example, Posner argued that privacy 
                                                                                                                  
 51. See Schoeman, supra note 34, at 22. 
 52. Id. at 24. 
 53. Id. at 23. 
 54. Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 77 (1978). 
 55. Robert S. Gerstein, California’s Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development 
of the Protection of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385, 422 (1982).  
 56. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455-56 (1980).  
 57. Id. at 443. 
 58. See generally Kai-Lung Hui & I.P.L. Png, The Economics of Privacy, in ECONOM-
ICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 471 (Terrence Hendershott ed., 2006) (providing a useful 
review of the economics of privacy literature).   
 59. Id. at 473; Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 649, 658, 663-64 (1980); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, REGU-
LATION, May-June 1978, at 19, 26; Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1-7 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 405, 408 (1981); George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Poli-
tics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 640 (1980).   
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is best understood not as a legitimate interest in its own right, but 
rather as an “intermediate good.”60 Posner viewed the interest in  
privacy as motivated by a socially suboptimal desire to hide either 
“information concerning past or present criminal activity, or moral 
conduct at variance with the individual’s professed moral standards,” 
or information that would “correct misapprehensions that the individ-
ual is trying to exploit.”61 Under this conception of privacy, any gov-
ernment regulation supporting privacy would be inherently inefficient.    
 After a long silence, scholars returned to consider this vision of 
privacy in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. Much of this 
scholarship came to the defense of privacy, both rejecting Posner’s 
narrow understanding of the benefits of privacy as well as pointing 
out that “there are dynamic benefits to privacy beyond the ‘taste’ for 
privacy that an individual may have.”62 For example, Richard Mur-
phy noted that “manipulating reputation is not the only reason peo-
ple desire privacy,” and that other “psychic values count” in the “util-
ity calculus” in determining when limiting disclosure of information 
is appropriate.63 Similarly, Paul Schwartz argued that a strong eco-
nomic argument can be made in favor of privacy, and that the narrow 
view of social utility “ignores the positive economic role that data pri-
vacy plays in many circumstances.”64 Writing from a consumer law 
perspective, Jeff Sovern noted that consumers seem to reject the 
Posner vision of privacy as a means to an end rather than an end in 
itself.65 Rosen argued that Posner’s vision of privacy fails to recognize 
that a “central value of privacy” is to prevent individuals “from being 
misidentified and judged out of context in a world of short attention 
spans, a world in which information can easily be confused with 
knowledge.”66 Certain categories of information about executives 
might be subject to Rosen’s argument. For example, executives might 
want to keep the specific details of health information private be-
cause of a belief that shareholders—the vast majority of whom are 
not trained in medicine—will not understand the actual implications 
of the health issue for the executive’s performance.         
                                                                                                                  
 60. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978).  
 61. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 233-34 (1983) (arguing that the 
individual want for privacy stems from people’s desire “to manipulate the world around 
them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves”).  
 62. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic De-
fense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996). 
 63. Id. at 2386.  
 64. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Infor-
mation, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22 (1997). 
 65. Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of 
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1052 (1999). 
 66. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
8 (2000); see also Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063 (2001) 
(expanding Rosen’s argument beyond the privacy context).   
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 Finally, the economics of privacy literature recognized the second-
ary harms that can occur when privacy is not adequately protected. 
For example, disclosure, or interference with privacy, can diminish 
the extent to which people engage in the underlying activity. This 
constitutes a social harm unless society wants to discourage the un-
derlying activity.67 In the context of personal health care information, 
this sort of distortion can lead to negative consequences including 
declines in preventive care.68
 With privacy largely rehabilitated as a legitimate interest, a new 
economics of privacy emerged, which not only sought to reconsider 
privacy questions in light of technological developments,69 but also for 
the first time applied formal microeconomic modeling to various as-
pects of the privacy debate. Significantly, the new literature recog-
nized privacy as a legitimate interest worthy of economic protection, 
although not at all costs.70 This literature also explored the role of 
contracts and the market in addressing various privacy-based prob-
lems.71 Similarly, this Article recognizes the executive’s privacy as an 
interest worthy of society’s consideration, but grapples with how to 
measure the value of that interest in light of competing disclosure 
costs to protection. 
2.   Heterogeneous Privacy Preferences 
 Evidence suggests that individual privacy preferences are hetero-
geneous. While numerous studies and surveys demonstrate that in-
dividuals value privacy, no conclusive work has established a meas-
urement or distribution of that value.72 Most of the work that has 
been done within the consumer context, however, is consistent with a 
view that privacy preferences are heterogeneous.73 For example, sev-
eral polls suggest that some consumers have more of a taste for pri-
vacy than others. A 1990 Equifax survey showed that 39% of re-
spondents viewed the sharing of information by companies in the 
                                                                                                                  
 67. Murphy, supra note 62, at 2387.  
 68. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 31-33.  
 69. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000) 
(applying aspects of a law and economics approach in concluding that privacy is not dead 
despite the various technological advancements encroaching upon it). 
 70. See id. at 1467.  
 71. Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online Inter-
personal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (2010) (proposing a standardized system of 
online user-to-user confidentiality agreements as a way to address privacy in social media); 
Karl T. Muth, Googlestroika: Privatizing Privacy, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 337 (2009) (describing 
from a law-and-economics perspective why Google is ideally positioned to price privacy); 
Joseph Siprut, Privacy Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for Expanding the 
Right of Privacy in Public Places, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 311 (2006) (arguing for expanding the 
right of privacy by extending the reach of related tort law for economic reasons). 
 72. Hui & Png, supra note 58, at 489.   
 73. Further empirical work demonstrating the heterogeneity of privacy preferences for 
both individuals and specifically executives would helpfully contribute to this scholarship.    
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same industry as a major problem, 43% called it a minor problem, 
and 16% said it was not a problem at all.74 Similarly, 57% of consumers 
responded that providing excessively personal information is a major 
problem, 33% identified it as a minor problem, and 10% identified no 
problem at all.75 This complicates the already challenging question of 
how to account for competing privacy and disclosure interests. 
 Extrapolating from similar privacy opinion surveys, privacy schol-
ar Alan Westin concluded that the American public can be divided 
into three basic clusters of privacy preferences.76 At one extreme are 
the privacy fundamentalists, which Westin estimated to be approxi-
mately 25% of the population.77 Privacy fundamentalists view privacy 
as “especially high value,” and believe that more individuals should 
refuse to give out information they are asked for.78 The largest group, 
which Westin called privacy pragmatists and estimated at 55% of the 
population, takes a more nuanced approach to privacy.79 This group 
balances the value of requests for personal information both to them 
and society and “decides whether they will agree or disagree with 
specific information activities.”80 Finally, the privacy unconcerned 
group, estimated at 20%, fails to recognize “what the ‘privacy fuss’ is 
all about.”81 This group has no objection to supplying personal infor-
mation to the government or businesses.82       
 Similarly, business scholar Il-Horn Hann, and information sys-
tems scholars Kai-Lung Hui, Tom S. Lee, and I.P.L. Png identified 
three distinct segments in the consumer population based on privacy 
preferences.83 Rather than using opinion surveys, these scholars em-
ployed the technique of conjoint analysis84 across focus groups in both 
the United States and Singapore to assess trade-offs among five di-
mensions—two benefits and three privacy concerns.85 Employing clus-
ter analysis,86 Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png found that 72% of the Ameri-
                                                                                                                  
 74. Sovern, supra note 65, at 1059. 
 75. Id.







 83. Hann et al., supra note 10, at 3.   
 84. Conjoint analysis is a technique that presents test subjects with a set of alterna-
tives consisting of particular levels of various dimensions. The subject is then asked to 
rank the alternatives based on individual preferences. Conjoint analysis then assumes that 
the ranking “can be decomposed into the sum of contributions from the multiple dimen-
sions.” Then each part-worth is equivalent to the marginal utility of the dimension in the 
individual’s ranking of the conjoint stimuli. Id. at 8.   
 85. Id. at 9. 
 86. Cluster analysis “groups subjects into distinct segments according to the similarity 
of their estimated part-worths for the various dimensions.” Id. at 14.    
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can subjects can be characterized as “privacy guardians”—those who 
attach a relatively high value to information privacy.87 Approximate-
ly 20% of the American subjects can be characterized as “information 
sellers”—those who attach a relatively high value to monetary re-
ward without much regard for privacy.88   
 Although the conjoint analysis study broke down the groups dif-
ferently than Westin, both observe very different attitudes towards 
privacy across individuals.89 Despite possible methodological prob-
lems with both public opinion surveys90 and the conjoint analysis 
study,91 this scholarship is at least consistent with the idea that some 
individuals “have more of a taste for privacy than others.”92 Behav-
ioral economic theories may also support the idea that privacy pref-
erences are heterogeneous. Economists hypothesize that “[p]ersonal 
information is such a sensitive thing that individual behavior is rela-
tively more likely to depart from the rational model with respect to 
personal information than other things.”93   
 Despite the fact that this scholarship has taken place in the con-
text of consumer preferences, there is no particular reason to believe 
that the pool of potential corporate executives would be different 
from the general population in having heterogeneity of preferences. 
Therefore, although further work is necessary to be able to say with 
any certainty that (absent sorting resulting from existing disclosure 
policies) executive privacy preferences would be heterogeneous, the 
existing evidence is certainly consistent with that hypothesis. 
 If in fact privacy preferences are heterogeneous, and it is both dif-
ficult to measure those preferences, as well as to fully understand 
how those preferences are distributed, then creating a singular uni-
form policy that adequately accounts for both disclosure and privacy 
interests would be challenging. Instead, these broad differences in 
privacy preferences suggest that for any rule to adequately accom-
modate the preferences of different individuals, that rule will need to 
                                                                                                                  
 87. Id. at 15.  
 88. Id. Finally, the smallest cluster of subjects focused exclusively on convenience 
with little regard for money or website privacy policies. This final group, however, is less 
relevant outside the context of consumer studies, as convenience plays less of a role in the 
executive disclosure context. Id.
 89. See id. at 16.  
 90. Although surveys may be affected by the manner in which the questions are 
posed, even taking this into account, Sovern concludes that the surveys seem to indicate 
that consumers are divided. Sovern, supra note 65, at 1061. 
 91. For example, the authors point that the subjects were all undergraduate students 
and therefore would want to verify the findings with a more representative sample of sub-
jects. Hann et al., supra note 10, at 19.    
 92. Sovern, supra note 65, at 1058. 
 93. Hui & Png, supra note 58, at 492.  
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be flexible by design.94 Heterogeneous privacy preferences may also 
suggest additional reasons that reinforce why the executive’s interest 
in privacy should not be easily dismissed. Absent an ability to protect 
privacy in some way, a private candidate for a corporate executive 
position may forgo the opportunity for fear that it will require unac-
ceptable intrusions of privacy. Since there is no reason to believe that 
society inherently prefers corporate executives who do not care about 
privacy, the sorting that would result harms society by unnecessarily 
limiting the pool of individuals who can then be corporate executives 
in public companies. Furthermore, to the extent that corporations are 
increasingly in a position of imposing upon the privacy of individu-
als,95 there may be a problem with allowing decisionmaking about the 
privacy of society to be concentrated largely in the hands of those 
with lower valuations of privacy.96   
C.   Status Quo Failures 
 The privacy-disclosure problem explained thus far requires a solu-
tion that appropriately considers both the disclosure and privacy in-
terests, and takes into account the fact that privacy preferences may 
be heterogeneous.97 The status quo fails to satisfy these require-
ments. Although it is unclear what exactly is required with regard to 
disclosure of personal information about executives under the current 
corporate disclosure regime, it is clear that the regime offers no ex-
plicit method for taking into account privacy interests, much less 
heterogeneity in those interests.98 At the same time, the various stat-
utory, constitutional, and tortious privacy laws were not designed to 
target the corporate disclosure context, and thus fail to adequately 
                                                                                                                  
 94. See id. at 1059 (making a similar point in the consumer context). See also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A Trip-
tych 25 (Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Working Paper RPP-2012-17, 2012) (point-
ing out the implications of heterogeneity on personalized default rules). 
 95. See Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a  
Re-Imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 137-60 (2006) 
(arguing that information privacy is governed not just by governmental law but also by 
corporations via private governance).  
 96. This concern will be explored further in future scholarship.  
 97. See supra Part II.  
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possible heterogeneity in privacy preferences. See  Heminway, supra note 5, at 790-96 (de-
scribing a proposal for a new way of dealing with disclosure of executives’ personal facts); 
Horwich, supra note 11, at 862-70 (proposing an addition to form 8-K addressing specifical-
ly disclosure of serious illness of executives); Lin, Undressing the CEO, supra note 11, at 
409-16 (describing a two-step, principle-based model for disclosure); Andrew K. Glenn, 
Note, Disclosure of Executive Illnesses Under Federal Securities Law and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990: Hobson’s Choice or Business Necessity?, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
537, 588-89 (1994) (proposing a safe harbor for corporations for nondisclosure of executive 
health information). But see Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1549-50 (defending the 
status quo). 
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address the problem. With neither corporate law nor privacy law 
providing any clarity, corporations, executives, and shareholders lack 
guidance and certainty with regard to the disclosure of the execu-
tives’ personal information.         
1.   Corporate Disclosure Rules Ignore Privacy 
 No consensus exists regarding when and under what circumstanc-
es the disclosure of private facts about executives is required under 
the existing legal corporate disclosure regulatory and statutory 
framework.99 Other than specific rules requiring the disclosure of the 
CEO’s age,100 the CEO’s involvement in certain legal proceedings,101
and the compensation of five highly paid executives,102 the existing 
securities rules and regulations governing corporate disclosure con-
tain no specific itemized guidance for disclosure of personal infor-
mation about executives. Instead, private facts about executives seem 
to be subject to disclosure under the same general disclosure regime 
created by the Exchange Act and the SEC rules as other types of cor-
porate information.103 Scholars and practitioners disagree, however, 
as to whether there is anything in the securities laws that creates a 
duty to disclose personal information about executives.104
                                                                                                                  
 99. See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 1 (“There are no hard and fast rules about how 
and when companies need to disclose information about the health of their chief execu-
tives.”); Benjamin Pimentel, Public Disclosure: Health of CEOs Brings Up Issues of 
Personal Privacy, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/ 
Public-disclosure-Health-of-CEOs-brings-up-2736558.php (“There are no rules on what 
CEOs are supposed to disclose about their health. . . . ‘The question is what and when and 
how much, and that’s always been a matter of some dispute.’ ” (citation omitted)); Brad 
Stone, Apple Chief Goes Public on Health, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at B1 (reporting that a 
former SEC commissioner stated that there was little agreement among legal scholars 
about what needs to be disclosed when a CEO becomes ill).    
 100. Item 401 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of general biographical detail in-
cluding the CEO’s age. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b) (2012).    
 101. Item 401(f) of Regulation S-K requires the company to disclose the CEO’s personal 
bankruptcy filings, any adjudicated violations of the securities or commodities laws, and 
the fact that the CEO “was convicted in a criminal proceeding or is a named subject of a 
pending criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations and other minor offenses).” This 
rule does not on its face apply to most types of civil litigation, such as divorce or a criminal 
investigation. Id. § 229.401(f)(1), (2).      
 102. Regulation S-K, Item 402, requires disclosure of the salary, bonus, stock awards, 
stock option awards, and other components of compensation for the principal executive 
officer, principal financial officer, and the three most highly compensated executive officers 
other than the former. Id. § 229.402. 
 103. See Stone, supra note 99 (noting a statement by a former member of the SEC that 
while there are no specific disclosure requirements for the health of corporate officers, 
there is also nothing in the federal securities laws about privacy rights).  
 104. Compare Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1591 (finding no basis for an affirma-
tive duty to disclose private CEO facts), with Horwich, supra note 11, at 838 (expressing 
that there is “little doubt that [the requirement to disclose ‘known . . . uncertainties . . . 
that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material . . . unfavorable impact on net 
sales or revenues or incomes from continuing operations’] would encompass material un-
certainties arising out of a known health problem suffered by a luminary” (footnote and 
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 Where a duty to disclose arises, disclosure issues primarily depend 
on whether a given fact is material.105 Under existing Supreme Court 
precedent information is material if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider the information im-
portant in making an investment decision, or if disclosure of the 
fact would be viewed by a reasonable investor as significantly alter-
ing the “total mix” of information.106 For so-called soft information 
regarding predictions and other forward-looking information, a 
somewhat different test applies, in which materiality depends on “a 
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur 
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of 
the company activity.”107   
 Neither of these tests contains any explicit consideration of priva-
cy as a countervailing interest, yet some commentators seem to sense 
that privacy does, or at least ought to, play a role in the analysis.108
Even in the absence of an explicit privacy consideration, scholars 
and commentators have noted the difficulty in applying these mate-
riality standards to the personal information of executives.109 No 
court decision has weighed in on the question, nor has the SEC of-
fered any guidelines.110
2.   Privacy Law Lacks Clarity 
 The various privacy laws fail to add clarity to the corporate disclo-
sure framework. A clearly defined constitutional informational priva-
cy right would eliminate or at least narrow the normative policy 
question because it would be unconstitutional for the government  
to mandate disclosure of at least some categories of executive  
information. No such clearly established informational privacy right  
                                                                                                                  
citation omitted)), and id. at 841 (finding a possible duty to disclose from the Rule 12b-20 
requirement for disclosing material omissions). Accord Heminway, supra note 5, at 757 
(noting that “the gap-filling rules may require public disclosure of executives’ personal 
facts”).
 105. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1596-1600 (distinguishing the duty to  
disclose from the concept of materiality and explaining that materiality only comes into 
play once a duty to disclose has been triggered).  
 106. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).  
 107. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238.  
 108. Patrick McGurn, senior vice president of Institutional Shareholder Services, ex-
plained that while there is no clear rule for when corporations must disclose personal in-
formation, part of that analysis involves weighing an individual’s privacy rights against 
the value of that information to the marketplace. See Pimentel, supra note 99.  
 109. Horwich, supra note 11, at 864 (arguing that “determining whether an ailment is 
material is often difficult” and “presents difficult questions of judgment”); Lin, Undressing 
the CEO, supra note 11, at 408 (explaining that the “federal securities laws along with 
historic and widely-accepted practices . . . offer little clear guidance as to what a company 
should do” when it comes to disclosing personal facts about executives).   
 110. Lin, Undressing the CEO, supra note 11, at 386.  
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exists under the current state of constitutional law.111 Although two 
1977 Supreme Court cases, Whalen and Nixon, referred broadly to a 
constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters,”112 neither case made clear that such an interest actually 
existed, or what test applied to determine whether any such constitu-
tional privacy interest had been triggered. Subsequently, circuit 
courts offered varying interpretations of the two decisions, ranging 
from a requirement that disclosure of some types of personal infor-
mation should be subject to a balancing test between the govern-
ment’s interest and the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure,113
to a belief that any constitutional informational privacy right only 
extends to interests “that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit  
in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ”114 The D.C. Circuit went so far as  
to express “grave doubts as to the existence of a constitutional right 
[to informational] privacy.”115
 More recently, the Supreme Court again weighed in on the ques-
tion of an informational right to privacy in NASA v. Nelson,116 but did 
not provide much further clarity. The majority opinion chose to “as-
sume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects” a constitu-
tional privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.117
In applying this hypothetical constitutional right, the Court appears 
to have balanced the governmental interest with the privacy interest, 
but did so without any clear articulation of the governing rules. The 
Court does not appear to have applied the “fundamental rights” strict 
scrutiny analysis of Roe v. Wade,118 but instead described the govern-
ment’s actions as “reasonable and further[ing] its interests.”119 In fact, 
the Court seemed to reject a strict scrutiny inquiry, at least in the par-
ticular context at issue in that decision, when it rejected the argument 
that the government “has a constitutional burden to demonstrate that 
                                                                                                                  
 111. But see Stokes, supra note 5, at 313-22 (concluding that a regulation requiring 
corporate executives to disclose health issues to shareholders would not be constitutional).   
 112. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 
425, 457 (1977) (citing Whalen).   
 113. See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Woodland v. City of  
Houston, 940 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Fraternal Order of Police v. City 
of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 
(2d Cir. 1983).
 114. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (1981). 
 115. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997).  
 116. 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
 117. Id. at 751.   
 118. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Others had suggested that such a strict scrutiny test 
would apply to informational privacy. See Stokes, supra note 5, at 314 (“[C]ourts would 
next likely apply the strict scrutiny test to determine whether the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling state interest, and goes no further than necessary to ac-
complish this objective.”). 
 119. NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 761.  
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its questions are ‘necessary’ or the least restrictive means of further-
ing its interests.”120 In a pair of concurrences, both Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas stated that they would have held that a “federal con-
stitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ does not exist.”121
 In short, even after NASA it is not clear that a constitutional right 
to informational privacy exists. Furthermore, even if such a right 
does exist, it seems likely that a government regulation requiring 
corporate executives to disclose some personal information would still 
pass constitutional muster, as long as the regulation sought to reach 
some sort of balance between the government’s interest in requiring 
disclosure in order to keep the markets functioning properly on be-
half of shareholders, and the privacy interest of the executive. 
 Similarly, the various federal and state statutory privacy protec-
tions do not resolve the disclosure-privacy issue in part because they 
were not designed with this particular problem in mind. Many priva-
cy statutes in the United States are specifically tailored to a particu-
lar problem, and none seem to anticipate this particular situation.122   
 Many federal privacy statutes only apply to certain statutorily de-
fined entities. For example, in the context of health information, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), enact-
ed by Congress in 1996, seeks to protect the security and privacy of 
health information.123 The “Privacy Rule” regulations implementing 
HIPAA protect the privacy of health information, in part by prohibit-
ing its disclosure without the consent of the individual, unless the 
disclosure is pursuant to one of the enumerated exceptions.124 HIPAA 
only applies, however, to “covered entities,” which include (1) health 
plans, (2) health care clearinghouses, (3) health care providers, as 
well as business associates to those covered entities.125 Although the 
regulations did recognize the need to strike a balance between priva-
cy concerns and the need to use certain health care information,  
the primary focus was on improving the efficiency of the health care 
                                                                                                                  
 120. Id. at 760.  
 121. Id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 769 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he Constitution does not protect a right to informational privacy.”).  
 122. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1567-75 (examining the implications of 
various privacy-related federal statutes on corporate disclosure obligations and concluding 
that many employment-related privacy statutes apply in very limited situations and have 
“idiosyncratic application”). But see Glenn, supra note 98, at 588 (treating the problem as a 
conflict between the requirements imposed by the corporate disclosure obligations of the 
federal securities laws and the ADA’s confidentiality provisions, in which corporations are 
faced with a “Hobson’s choice of liability under the ADA or liability under the Securities 
and Exchange Acts”).  
 123. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).  
 124. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2012).  
 125. Id. § 160.103.  
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system.126 Therefore, unrelated (albeit similar) concerns regarding 
the disclosure of executive information were not really on the radar, 
and corporate employers would not fall within HIPAA’s definition of 
covered entities. Similarly, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 
1978127 only prevents banks or other financial institutions from dis-
closing an individual’s financial information to the government. It 
would not prevent most corporate employers from disclosing financial 
or other personal information about executives to its shareholders.      
 Other privacy statutes would apply to the corporation as an em-
ployer, but only limit use of information obtained in very specific 
ways. Most significantly, the Americans with Disabilities Act,128 the 
Rehabilitation Act,129 and the Family and Medical Leave Act130 all 
contain nondisclosure provisions with regard to the disclosure of cer-
tain types of health and disability-related information. On their face, 
these statutes do not contain any explicit provisions under which an 
employee can waive rights of confidentiality for medical information. 
As a result, some have argued that the ADA may prevent any man-
datory shareholder disclosure requirement of executive illnesses.131
The case law interpreting the ADA and the other related statutes, 
however, has interpreted the nondisclosure provisions to be limited to 
information obtained as the result of an authorized medical examina-
tion or inquiry. Information obtained by the employer as the result of 
a voluntary disclosure on the part of the employee may be disclosed 
without consequence under these statutes. In Cash v. Smith, for ex-
ample, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could not recover 
under the nondisclosure provisions of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, 
and FMLA when she had told a manager of her diabetes diagnosis “in 
confidence.”132 The court found that the disclosure to the employer 
was voluntary, and therefore the statutory provisions did not ap-
ply.133 Similarly, in EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., the Tenth Circuit 
held that when an employee voluntarily informed his human  
resources manager that he was HIV positive, there was no violation 
of the ADA nondisclosure provisions when the company created  
an acknowledgement form to inform his driver trainees of his HIV 
                                                                                                                  
 126. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82,426, 82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000); 67 Fed. Reg. 14,776, 14,778-83 (proposed Mar. 27, 
2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182, 53,208 (Aug. 14, 2002).  
 127. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3421 (2012). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). 
 129. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
 130. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012)). 
 131. Glenn, supra note 98, at 588. 
 132. Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 133. Id. at 1307.  
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status.134 This means that a corporation could disclose the health-
related information of an executive if the executive voluntarily re-
vealed the information to the corporation.   
 Furthermore, district courts following the Cash and C.R. England 
precedents have taken a broad understanding of what constitutes a 
voluntary disclosure. For example, courts have found that a disclo-
sure was voluntary when an employer e-mailed an employee stating, 
“We need to know what’s going on,” when the employee had missed 
work without any explanation.135 The court held that even though the 
employer initiated the interaction, because the employer did not ask 
specifically about a medical condition, this did not constitute a re-
quest or demand for medical information by the employer that would 
trigger the nondisclosure provisions of the ADA.136 Similarly, courts 
have found that when an employer asks, “Is everything okay?” after 
an employee returns from a medical appointment, if the employee 
then proceeds to disclose the diagnosis and related disability, this 
constitutes a voluntary disclosure that does not trigger the nondisclo-
sure protections of the ADA.137 Consequently, if a corporation notices 
a change in an executive’s physical appearance and just asks the ex-
ecutive, “Is everything okay?” the corporation would have no nondis-
closure obligation under the ADA and the related statutes with re-
spect to any information provided pursuant to that inquiry. 
 Other privacy statutes also limit protections to information ob-
tained in particular ways. For example, the Employee Polygraph Pro-
tection Act of 1988 (EPPA) prohibits private employers from requir-
ing employees or prospective employees from taking a lie detector 
test, or to use the results of such a test.138 Similarly, the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act covers an employer’s use of information collected as 
part of a “consumer report” on an employment application.139 Neither 
statute governs the disclosure of employee information more general-
ly, much less considers the particular circumstances of an executive-
level employee in a publically traded corporation.    
 By contrast, genetic information may constitute the one category 
of information where privacy laws may limit corporate disclosure  
of personal information about executives. In addition to its various 
provisions prohibiting discrimination against employees because of 
genetic information, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
                                                                                                                  
 134. EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1032-33, 1046-48 (10th Cir. 2011); see 
also Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 529, 534-35 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (finding no 
breach of confidentiality under the ADA when employee voluntarily disclosed the result of his 
HIV test to his manager, although he asked the manager to keep the information confidential).  
 135. EEOC v. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans, 795 F. Supp. 2d 840, 842 (E.D. Wis. 2011).  
 136. Id. at 845.  
 137. Sherrer v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Health, 747 F. Supp. 2d 924, 931-34 (S.D. Ohio 2010).  
 138. 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (2012). 
 139. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2012). 
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of 2008 (GINA),140 contains limitations on disclosure of genetic infor-
mation.141 Although there is not yet any case law interpreting these 
provisions, GINA appears to limit corporations from disclosing genet-
ic information concerning its corporate executives to its shareholders, 
although it is unclear whether there would be any problem under 
GINA with the executive him or herself making the disclosure.   
3.   Corporate Practice Reflects Uncertainty 
 Corporate disclosure behavior mirrors the lack of clarity in the 
existing law. Corporations seeking to strike the appropriate balance 
between executive privacy and shareholder disclosure obligations 
have taken vastly different approaches.142 This state of confusion 
leaves both executives and shareholders uncertain as to when to ex-
pect disclosure of personal information about the executives.   
 Apple’s widely-discussed decision to take a strong nondisclosure 
position with regard to the health of CEO Steve Jobs provides an ex-
ample of one possible approach. In October 2003, doctors diagnosed 
Jobs with a rare treatable form of pancreatic cancer, for which the 
vast majority of those who had the tumor surgically removed sur-
vived at least ten years.143 Skeptical of mainstream medicine, howev-
er, Jobs pursued alternative methods to treat his cancer rather than 
undergo the operation.144 As Jobs fought his cancer without surgery, 
Apple’s board of directors and executive team agonized over whether 
the company needed to disclose anything about his health to share-
holders.145 After seeking advice from two outside lawyers, the board 
decided to say nothing.146 Ultimately, Jobs had the surgery at the end 
of July 2004, and the next day in an optimistic e-mail to Apple em-
ployees, Jobs revealed that he had faced a life-threatening illness, 
was now “cured,” and would return to the job in September.147 The 
                                                                                                                  
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (2012).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(b) (2012).
 142. See Lin, Undressing the CEO, supra note 11, at 408 (noting that “the absence of 
clarity in the current regulatory model” has resulted in “disclosure practices varying from 
company to company”).  





 147. Id. Ironically, at the time some commentators praised Apple for being so forthcom-
ing. Analyst Roger Kay of International Data Corp. speculated (wrongly) that Jobs and his 
doctors suspected something was wrong, and once they confirmed it, moved quickly. Kay 
praised Apple’s decision to make the news public only when it was certain of the diagnosis. 
See Pimentel, supra note 99. Similarly, Patrick McGurn, senior vice president of Institu-
tional Shareholder Services, called Apple’s disclosure “a good pre-emptive move.” Id.    
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next day Apple shares fell 2.4%.148 Citing Jobs’ need for privacy, Ap-
ple would not answer further questions about his health.149
 Concerns over Jobs’ health reappeared in June 2008, when his 
gaunt appearance at Apple’s annual Worldwide Developers Confer-
ence triggered rumors that he was again sick.150 Investors and ana-
lysts turned to Apple for an explanation. Peter Oppenheimer, the 
company’s chief financial officer replied that Jobs “serves as the 
C.E.O. at the pleasure of Apple’s board and has no plans to leave Ap-
ple. Steve’s health is a private matter.”151 When Jobs announced that 
he would not give his annual keynote address at the Macworld con-
ference in January 2009, rumors escalated leading to a 2.5% drop in 
Apple’s share price.152 In response, Jobs issued a letter in which he 
claimed that his dramatic weight loss was due to a nutritional prob-
lem with a simple remedy and that he would continue as Apple’s 
CEO.153 Only one week later, however, Jobs released another state-
ment that his health situation was “more complex” and he would be 
taking a leave from the company.154 This resulted in a 7% drop in Ap-
ple’s stock price.155 In June 2009, Apple disclosed that Jobs had re-
ceived a liver transplant two months earlier, but offered no further 
information.156 Finally, in January 2011, Jobs announced that he 
would once again take a medical leave from Apple without sharing 
any details of his condition with investors.157 In response, Apple’s 
stock dropped by 2.3%, but recovered the following day in light of 
news of Apple’s strong quarterly results.158 During his leave in Au-
gust 2011, Jobs resigned as CEO but continued to work from home as 
Chairman of the Board.159 On October 5, 2011, Jobs died from compli-
cations from his cancer at the age of 56.160
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 In contrast to Apple’s privacy-protective nondisclosure approach, 
Berkshire Hathaway took a different approach with regard to the 
health of its founder and chairman Warren Buffett. In 2000, Buffett 
underwent colon surgery to remove benign polyps in his colon.161 As 
opposed to the minimal information revealed by Apple after the fact, 
Berkshire Hathaway opted to provide a detailed press release before 
the surgery informing shareholders that Buffett expected to have the 
surgery and the circumstances that led to the surgery.162 Then, in 
2012, Berkshire Hathaway revealed that Buffett had been diagnosed 
with early-stage prostate cancer and that he would undergo radiation 
treatment beginning in July.163    
 Although undoubtedly Jobs and Buffett represent unique exam-
ples in the degree to which they were viewed as indispensable corporate 
luminaries within their respective companies, the same issue of wheth-
er and to what extent personal information about executives ought to 
be disclosed to shareholders arises with far less notable executives.  
 Some companies have chosen to disclose a good deal of information 
based on an apparent belief that it is legally required for them to do 
so. For example, after suffering from leukemia during his tenure as 
an executive, General Motors vice-chairman Harry J. Pearce opined 
that “[t]here is an absolute requirement to make full disclosure. And 
by full disclosure I mean full public disclosure.”164 Consistent with 
that view, GM disclosed Pearce’s illness when it was diagnosed.165
Dick Brewer, the former CEO of biotech firm Scios, took the same 
position: “I don’t think you have to describe every last detail of your 
illness,” he explained, “[b]ut you need to describe basically what it is, 
and how it’s going to be dealt with and how you plan to manage the 
company while being treated.”166 Based on that understanding, 
Brewer and his company’s board immediately revealed to the share-
holders when he was diagnosed with cancer.167      
 In 1993, Tenneco disclosed that CEO Michael Walsh had brain 
cancer.168 McDonald’s also chose to disclose the news when its CEO 
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Charles Bell was diagnosed with colon cancer.169 When Coca-Cola 
Co.’s longtime chief executive and chairman, Roberto C. Goizueta, 
was hospitalized for a malignant tumor in his lungs, Coca-Cola dis-
closed the fact of hospitalization, along with a disclosure that Goizue-
ta had smoked cigarettes for years.170 Of course, Coca-Cola tried to 
mitigate the impact of the news by also disclosing the treatment plan 
and stating that the executive planned to continue working while re-
ceiving radiation treatment.171 Some outlier companies have even 
gone so far as to disclose possible future health situations. For exam-
ple, Google announced that one of its executives has a gene mutation 
that increases his chances of having Parkinson’s disease.172   
 Other companies have taken Apple’s approach and disclosed far 
less information about their executives. For example, Intel did not 
disclose its CEO’s prostate cancer diagnosis.173 Similarly, Bear 
Stearns’ CEO Jimmy Cayne opted to entirely hide his near death 
from a prostate infection during the credit crisis because he feared 
that disclosing the information would cause Bear Stearns’ stock to 
crash. His hospitalization and life-threatening condition only came to 
light once the company had been sold.174 And in contrast with 
Google’s treatment of a Parkinson’s diagnoses, one chief executive 
kept his Parkinson’s diagnosis secret for almost twenty years.175
 Time Warner took a mixed approach with regard to the health in-
formation about CEO Steven Ross. In June 1980, Ross had a heart 
attack which he kept secret on the grounds that it would be “ ‘bad for 
the company’ if it became public.”176 Then in the mid-1980s, Ross was 
diagnosed with prostate cancer, but the diagnosis was never publicly 
disclosed despite the fact that he apparently had surgery and re-
ceived radiation.177 In November 1991, however, when the cancer re-
turned, Time Warner promptly revealed to its shareholders that Ross 
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had been diagnosed with cancer,178 and then subsequently disclosed 
his leave of absence when he needed further treatment,179 albeit with 
a positive spin. Despite Time Warner’s assurances that the “physi-
cians are optimistic,”180 Ross never returned to his office. As with Ap-
ple and Steve Jobs, it was only in mid-June 1992 that Ross finally 
publicly conceded the seriousness of his illness when he announced 
that he would be taking a temporary leave of absence.181      
 Other companies have chosen intermediate routes, disclosing only 
partial information. Kraft Foods, Inc. did not disclose the reason be-
hind the hospitalization of its CEO, which led to a controversy.182
Most recently, Sara Lee revealed that its CEO Brenda Barnes was 
taking a temporary medical leave, but did not initially disclose that 
she had had a stroke.183   
 Although most of the media publicity regarding personal executive 
information has occurred in the health context, disclosure issues can 
extend far beyond executive health. Other potential subjects for dis-
closure include criminal investigations,184 financial trouble, divorce,185
extramarital affairs or other romantic liaisons, the purchase of 
homes or other large luxury items, and the death or illness of a child 
or other loved one. 
 Overall, the lesson from the existing law, its treatment by the 
scholarship, and the way that it plays out in practice is that there 
remains a good deal of confusion regarding whether, when, and un-
der what circumstances corporations must reveal personal infor-
mation about its executives to its shareholders. This confusion can 
have a harmful impact on all the players involved as corporations, 
executives, and shareholders lack certainty with regard to how to ac-
count for both privacy and disclosure.    
                                                                                                                  
 178. See Horwich, supra note 11, at 829.   
 179. Id.; Adam Bryant, Time Warner’s Chief Takes Indefinite Leave, N.Y. TIMES, June 
15, 1992, at D1. 
 180. BRUCK, supra note 176, at 318. 
 181. Id. at 323. 
 182. Pimentel, supra note 99.
 183. Michael Oneal, Sara Lee CEO Reveals She Had a Stroke: Brenda Barnes Recovering, 
but No Other Details Given, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 2010, at C19. 
 184. For example, Chris Albrecht, the former chairman and CEO of HBO, was  
forced to resign days after his 2007 arrest for domestic violence. See Phil  
Rosenthal, HBO Plot Twist: Executive Quits After Alleged Assault, CHI. TRIB.
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http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/09/business/fi-hbo9.     
 185. For example, Steve Wynn tried unsuccessfully to seal the details of his divorce in 
order to keep it from shareholders. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1560. 
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III. NEGOTIATION AND DISCLOSURE OF DISCLOSURE POLICIES
 This Article proposes one possible solution for tackling the priva-
cy-disclosure problem discussed in Part II. This proposal involves a 
two-step process: 1) mandatory contracting between the executive 
and the corporation regarding the plan for disclosure of the execu-
tive’s personal information, and then 2) mandatory disclosure of the 
negotiated disclosure plan to the shareholders. This solution deliber-
ately presents a hybrid between a pure contracting solution advocat-
ed by one school of thought in the larger corporate disclosure context 
and a pure mandatory disclosure solution advocated by the opposing 
school of thought. In borrowing aspects from both types of regimes, 
the proposal takes advantage of beneficial features of both systems 
for the purposes of tackling this particular problem.    
A.   Revealing Privacy Preferences via Contract 
 The first step of the proposal envisions that the law would require 
executives and corporations to negotiate and then contract for an in-
dividualized policy for the disclosure of the executives’ personal in-
formation. As a result of that process, the goal is to implement a dis-
closure policy that adequately captures the executive’s privacy pref-
erences while still accounting for the shareholders' disclosure inter-
est. The outcome of the negotiation would therefore differ depending 
on the degree to which an executive values his or her own privacy. 
This mandatory contracting regime improves upon a traditional 
mandatory disclosure regime, which fails to allow any flexibility or 
opt-out to account for heterogeneous privacy preferences. If the exist-
ing studies in the consumer context are correct, even privacy guardi-
ans (what Westin calls privacy fundamentalists)186 are willing to part 
with privacy, but for a very high cost.187 Through contract the parties 
can decide whether it is “worth it” to pay the high cost by increasing 
the compensation to the executive for the possible imposition on the 
strong privacy preference. In many cases, the answer may be that it 
is not worth that high cost, and the parties would end up with a pri-
vate-disclosure policy in which a good deal of executive’s personal in-
formation will not be disclosed. For privacy pragmatists, the cost of 
giving up privacy will be lower, although still not trivial. Privacy 
pragmatists might be expected to have strong valuations for certain 
aspects of privacy, but perhaps not others. As a result, some of these 
executives would contract with the corporations for privacy-disclosure 
policies that protect those aspects of their privacy that they value the 
most highly, whereas other executives’ privacy valuations may be 
within what the corporation is willing to pay.    
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 Even accounting for a wide variety of privacy preferences, it is 
empirically possible that executive valuations of privacy always ex-
ceed the value of disclosure to the shareholders. Similarly, the exact 
opposite is also possible: that the value of disclosure to the share-
holders always exceeds the individual valuations of privacy. In the 
former scenario, we would expect to see very privacy-protective dis-
closure policies, as it would not be worth it to the corporation to com-
pensate the executive for a more disclosure-friendly policy. In the lat-
ter scenario, we would expect to see very disclosure-friendly disclo-
sure policies and executives compensated for those policies, as it 
would be worth it to the corporation to essentially purchase the pri-
vacy violation from the executive. If either of these two extreme sce-
narios represents reality, then the negotiation and contracting solu-
tion should still reach the appropriate result. Realistically, however, 
it is unlikely for the equilibrium to exist at either extreme.188    
 This mandatory negotiation and contract process should reveal 
individual privacy preferences and valuations better than alternative 
institutional options. While individuals certainly do not have perfect 
understandings of their own privacy preferences and valuations, the 
data suggests that individuals do have discrete and heterogeneous 
preferences.189 Even if the contracting process does not perfectly value 
the individual executive’s privacy preferences, it can track individual 
privacy preferences more closely than the alternatives: a court, legisla-
ture, or regulatory agency deciding or guessing how much the individ-
ual ought to or does value privacy.   
 In implementing this proposal, policymakers ought to consider 
whether to place any substantive constraints upon the mandatory 
contracting policy. One option would be for the law to impose no sub-
stantive restraints on the negotiation, and to let the parties develop 
any disclosure policy whatsoever. A slight variation on this option 
would be for the law to impose no additional constraints other than 
those already in existence for protection of certain groups such as 
pregnancy, race, disability, and age.190
                                                                                                                  
 188. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 41 (In the context of consumer personal health 
information, “a socially optimal distribution of information is unlikely to exist at either 
extreme on the privacy/disclosure continuum.”).   
 189. See supra Part II.  
 190. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 
(2012); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (protecting 
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 This proposal offers an improvement upon a pure contract regime 
that would use a traditional default rule, which the parties could 
then contract around. At the outset, it is hard for policymakers to de-
termine the efficient default rule. Even if the efficient default could 
be determined, however, there are various reasons to believe that 
parties might find themselves stuck in a default and unable to con-
tract around that default.191 First, under even the most traditional 
account, the drafting costs themselves may cause stickiness. Even 
putting aside the traditional transaction costs of the simple legal fees 
to draft the relevant provision, however, there are other possible rea-
sons it may be difficult for the parties to opt out of the default rules. 
In the context of discussing some potential benefits of mandatory dis-
closure rules, Easterbrook and Fischel recognize that under a pure 
contract regime “no firm would have the appropriate incentives to 
create the [most effective] formula for disclosure” of this information 
in a way that allows shareholders to make useful comparisons.192 Ad-
ditionally, Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan have identified that 
when contracting against a background of default rules, network ex-
ternalities cause the choice of one firm’s contract to affect the value of 
other firms’ contracts.193 In other words, developing an entirely new 
disclosure policy from scratch may impose excessive transaction costs 
on the parties, which individually they might not undertake, absent 
the ability to coordinate in some way.194 Given these network exter-
nalities and the existence of heterogeneous privacy preferences, faced 
with a default rule, corporations may suboptimally remain in the de-
fault policy because of an inability of those with nonmajoritarian pri-
vacy preferences to coordinate with others to efficiently design a dif-
ferent disclosure policy.195 An additional concern is that given that 
corporate disclosure rules have historically been mandatory, a shift 
to a pure default regime may not suffice as accrued network bene-
fits may have created a significant bias against opting out of a par-
ticular default.196 This may be exacerbated by a signaling concern 
resulting from opting out of a default.197 Under the signaling concern 
                                                                                                                  
 191. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 
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 194. See Klausner, supra note 193.  
 195. Id. at 832. 
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 197. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 59 (1993) (integrating default rules analysis and relational contract theory); Jason 
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idea, parties do not opt out even when they would otherwise do so,  
because of a concern that opting out from what is viewed as the “norm” 
(as communicated by the existence of the default itself) by proposing 
opt-out privacy policies “may in and of itself raise suspicion.”198            
 Therefore, to address some of these challenges of a pure default 
system, this Article proposes that policymakers develop a menu of 
possible disclosure options for the parties to choose from.199 A menu 
approach would help reduce transaction costs,200 and increase a 
standardized format that facilitates comparative use of what is dis-
closed.201 The purpose of the menu would be to allow executives with 
heterogeneous privacy preferences to adopt disclosure policies tai-
lored to their particular preferences202 while allowing for network ex-
ternalities among executives with similar preferences. A menu ap-
proach can also help reduce the possibility of locking in a sub-optimal 
equilibrium as menu options could be revised with time.203 This sort 
of menu contract would also help solve the problem of negative sig-
nals from opting out because under a menu, parties do not have the 
choice to remain silent.204 This sort of menu proposal is one example 
of what Cass Sunstein calls a regime of active choice in which indi-
viduals are forced to decide among various options because the con-
tract cannot be silent with regard to a particular term.205              
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 In developing the precise contours of the menu of options, policy-
makers must consider whether executives and shareholders are like-
ly to want to treat disclosure of certain categories of information dif-
ferently than other categories of information. In making these menu 
design choices, policymakers must balance having an optimal disclo-
sure policy for executives with heterogeneous preferences among dif-
ferent dimensions, against the information costs of learning about 
different options. At some point, excessive options and choices reduce 
the usability both for the parties doing the contracting, and for the 
shareholders who need to use the disclosure policy.   
 One possible division worth consideration for inclusion on the 
menu is a distinction between disclosures of personal information 
exclusively about the executive, and disclosures that involve the pri-
vacy of a third party such as a spouse or child. Additionally, the cor-
poration and executive by means of the menu contract may wish to 
reach different disclosure policies for all personal health information, 
all family-related information, and all other information. The menu 
should not go so far as to distinguish between very specific infor-
mation, such as a policy agreement to disclose liver cancer, but not 
prostate cancer, as that level of detail is unlikely to be linked to dif-
ferent privacy preferences, but rather to knowledge of underlying in-
formation. Additionally, the contract may wish to distinguish be-
tween personal information that currently has an impact on the ex-
ecutive, and personal information that has some probability of having 
an impact on the executive in the future. Because the latter category 
involves various layers of probabilities, the menu options can usefully 
consider disclosure separately for each category. Finally, the contract 
should specify the detail of disclosure required. For example, a more 
privacy-protective policy may require that the corporation disclose 
the fact of impairment, but not the reason for the impairment. A 
more disclosure-leaning solution would also require disclosure of the 
reason for the impairment.  
 Overall, development of such a menu form would help the parties 
think through the different options that should be resolved by the 
disclosure policy. Parties would have the option to negotiate for no 
disclosure whatsoever for certain or all categories of personal infor-
mation, for example, information involving third parties. These ques-
tions could be thought through systematically and incorporated into 
a relatively simple form that could help reduce transaction costs and 
avoid the need for the parties to think through all the options from 
scratch each time; by being forced to fill in the blanks, parties would 
actively negotiate for the privacy and disclosure preferences for vari-
ous types of information. Regardless of the exact form of the negotiated 
contract, or the extent to which options are limited or infinite, the im-
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portant new idea is that the executive would have the ability to reveal 
individualized privacy preferences in the course of those negotiations.206
 The negotiation and contract process should take place at the be-
ginning of the executive relationship in order to optimize the pro-
cess.207 By negotiating and contracting for the privacy policy at the 
time of hiring or promotion to the executive position, the parties are 
already engaged in negotiations regarding various complex terms of 
employment.208 This further reduces the marginal transactional costs 
that results from contracting as compared to those for parties not al-
ready at the bargaining table. Furthermore, limiting the negotiation 
to the beginning of the relationship increases the probability that the 
executive is acting primarily based on knowledge of his or her overall 
privacy preferences, rather than knowledge of an existing personal 
fact, which the executive wishes to keep private. By having upfront 
negotiation and contracting it is still possible that a privacy-
protective policy means that the executive has something to hide, but 
it is equally possible that it just means that the executive is a private 
person.209 Because shareholders cannot distinguish between the two 
options, there is a reduced concern of unraveling and the contract 
signaling to shareholders the very sort of information that the priva-
cy-disclosure policy is designed to keep private.210
 Relatedly, corporations and executives should not be permitted to 
renegotiate the disclosure policy on an ad hoc basis. For example, if 
                                                                                                                  
 206. See Murphy, supra note 62, at 2393 (“In the absence of contract, [a privacy] pref-
erence is often difficult to determine.”).   
 207. As with other types of disclosure, the timing of the actual disclosure should also be 
carefully considered in order to minimize strategic timing of disclosures to maximize  
performance-based compensation. See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corpo-
rate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned  
Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 87-88 (2000) (explaining that managers’ tradi-
tional discretion over the timing of corporate disclosures allows them to maximize their 
own performance-based compensation).
 208. See Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Ex-
ecutive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 310-11 (2009) (describing the executive 
pay decision as part of the decision to hire a CEO, in which boards choose between various 
candidates with varying traits and competencies and negotiate on complicated aspects of  
executive compensation).   
 209. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY 
AND THE LAW 95 (1994) (“Unraveling may not occur (or will not be complete) if there is a 
chance that a player has never acquired the relevant information. In such a case, one will 
not be able to tell whether players are silent because they do not have the relevant infor-
mation or because they have the information but do not wish to reveal it.”). 
 210. See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat 
of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1195 (2011) (noting that economic 
theory cannot predict the point at which privacy’s unraveling may be less than complete, 
but “in some instances the equilibrium may allow some market participants with less than 
ideal information to keep that information private”); see also Verrechia, supra note 12, at 
142 (noting that uncertainty may be a rationale for the withholding of information because 
there is the possibility that the information is bad, or because the information in question 
has yet to arrive).    
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the executive and corporation were permitted to spontaneously re-
negotiate for a more privacy-protective policy, then shareholders 
would immediately assume that the policy change means that the 
executive has something to hide.211 This would undermine the very 
purpose of negotiating for a disclosure policy.    
 On the other hand, policymakers may wish to consider permitting 
renegotiation of the disclosure policy at a pre-determined interval. 
Just as in the health insurance context, in which individuals are 
permitted to change their insurance levels during a pre-determined 
open enrollment window, a similar option may be possible, for exam-
ple allowing for renegotiation after five or ten years. This can help 
address the problem that individual privacy preferences may change 
over time.212 Borrowing further from the insurance context, perhaps a 
pre-existing condition type of model can help avoid the concern that 
what is actually being protected in the revised policy is a new per-
sonal problem rather than new privacy preferences. For example, an 
executive who has gone through a particular health challenge may 
realize that as a result his or her privacy preferences have shifted in 
favor of privacy. Therefore, when the “open enrollment” window 
comes along, the executive wishes to amend the disclosure policy in 
favor of disclosing less private information. The pre-existing condi-
tion idea would mean that the executive’s existing health condition, 
or directly related conditions would continue to be disclosed under 
the former policy, but new and unrelated information could be dis-
closed at the reduced level in the new policy. 
 Policymakers must also decide which set of executives would ne-
gotiate a disclosure policy with the corporation. The most straight-
forward possibility is to limit the regime to the chief executive officer. 
This would be the most easy to administer, as each corporation would 
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only have to engage in a single negotiation, and shareholders would 
only have to keep track of a single policy. On the other hand, limiting 
the proposal to the CEO means that other high-level executives 
would not be able to negotiate for disclosure policies that adequately 
reflect their own privacy preferences.   
 An alternative option is to develop a definition of a covered person 
based on such considerations as indispensability to the company. For 
example, one practitioner proposes defining the covered person as  
a director of, employee of or independent contractor retained by 
the [corporation] who performs functions on behalf of or for the 
[corporation] that are not, at the time of the [disclosure decision], 
provided to the [corporation] by any other person, are fundamental 
to the financial performance of the [corporation] and, in the good 
faith judgment of the [corporation], could not be performed by any-
one currently employed by or retained by the [corporation.]213
This particular language was designed as “deliberately narrow” and 
covers very few executives, but a different definition could be drafted, 
which covers more executives.  
 The Article proposes a possible alternative that builds upon fea-
tures of the existing disclosure regime. The law already requires that 
corporations provide its shareholders with full compensation infor-
mation for the CEO and the four most highly compensated executive 
officers by means of a summary compensation table.214 Therefore, in a 
world in which that sort of disclosure already exists, extending the 
negotiation and contract process to that same set of executives makes 
sense to the extent that executive compensation can be viewed as a 
general approximation for how vital that executive is to the corpora-
tion, and therefore a decent proxy for the set of executives for whom 
shareholders have a legitimate disclosure interest. This also makes 
sense conceptually to the extent that the privacy-disclosure policy 
can be viewed as a piece of the compensation puzzle, as corporations 
may have to increase compensation to the executive if they wish to 
decrease the amount of privacy maintained by the executive and vice 
versa. Therefore, the entire picture of compensation can be presented 
if the negotiation and contract is limited to those executives for whom 
full compensation disclosure is already provided to shareholders.  
B.   Revealing Disclosure Preferences via Disclosure 
 The second step of the proposal would require the corporation to 
disclose the precise disclosure policy agreed upon with the executive 
to its shareholders. This necessarily means that while the precise 
process of the negotiation would not be proscribed by the law, the 
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law would mandate the existence of the final product from that  
process—namely, the disclosure policy itself. 
 Disclosing the disclosure policy to the shareholders helps keep the 
interest of the corporation and the interests of the shareholders more 
closely aligned with regard to the shareholders’ preferences for dis-
closure, in order to help avoid a possible agency problem. It is true 
that alignment is not perfect, given that shareholders do not negoti-
ate directly with the executive, but the corporation is more likely to 
align its bargaining position over time with the shareholders if it is 
required to disclose the agreed-upon policy to the shareholders. If the 
corporation fails to properly represent the shareholders position with 
regard to disclosure, then the shareholders can move their capital to 
a corporation that more accurately reflects their disclosure desires 
and views. For example, suppose that a particular executive and cor-
poration bargain for a privacy policy that is fairly protective of priva-
cy. The policy states that the corporation will not disclose personal 
information about the executive unless it is currently substantially 
impacting his or her ability to do his or her job, and even then will 
only disclose the fact of the situation, not the underlying personal 
facts. The corporation will then have to disclose this nondisclosure 
policy to its shareholders. If this minimal disclosure is not satisfacto-
ry to shareholders, then the market should respond by lowering the 
price of the corporation's stock in response to such a policy. In the 
long run then, the market will help inform and measure the strength 
of shareholder preferences for disclosure. 
 In addition to revealing shareholder disclosure preferences, dis-
closing the nondisclosure policy to the shareholders helps clarify the 
expectations of everyone involved regarding the circumstances under 
which disclosure will occur. Under the current system, shareholders 
do not know when and under what circumstances corporations will 
disclose information about executives to the shareholders. Additional 
clarity on this front helps with decisionmaking for everyone involved.   
 This second step also provides the second half of the insurance 
that corporations abide by the disclosed disclosure policy by taking 
advantage of the litigious nature of American society. Thinking about 
the example of Steve Jobs, if Steve Jobs and Apple had negotiated at 
the outset for a particular disclosure policy, then all parties involved 
would have had clear expectations regarding what would need to be 
disclosed. Shareholders would have known that Apple would either 
never disclose personal information about Jobs, would always dis-
close personal information about Jobs, or would disclose personal in-
formation about Jobs only given certain contractually-identified cir-
cumstances. If Apple had disclosed information about Jobs that it 
had contractually promised not to disclose, then Jobs himself would 
have had a cause of action. Suppose on the other hand (as in fact was 
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the case) that Apple did not disclose any of the health issues that 
Jobs was having until the very end when it was revealed that he was 
terminally ill with cancer. The question from the perspective of the 
shareholder would be whether that disclosure was consistent with 
Apple’s declared disclosure policy. If Apple’s behavior was incon-
sistent with a good faith compliance with the disclosure policy, then 
it would be fairly straightforward for a shareholder to bring such a 
suit. This is only possible, however, by mandating disclosure of the 
disclosure policy and giving the shareholders a clear expectation of 
disclosure and a correlated cause of action. It might also make sense 
to give the SEC the power to bring a case for violation of a disclosed 
nondisclosure policy in order to increase pressure on corporations to 
abide by the agreed-upon policies.     
 Scholars have also recognized that disclosure fails if the target of 
the disclosure cannot understand or process the information.215 The 
menu approach proposed above to help facilitate contracting can also 
help with usability/readability. At a minimum, by implementing a 
standard format and common vocabulary across different disclosure 
policies, such menu contracts would allow shareholders to do direct 
comparison of various corporate disclosure policies.216 Similarly, the 
actual language of the menu options can be designed to maximize 
completeness of disclosure as well as comprehensibility by the share-
holders. Additionally, all of this information could be presented on 
the summary compensation table, which currently serves as a single 
location where all top executive compensation is presented. At the 
bottom of each column of information for a particular executive, cor-
porations could include electronic links or simple attachments to the 
executive’s summary compensation information.      
 In the long run, it would then be possible to design easy software 
tools to help shareholders search for corporations that meet their 
minimal requirements. For example, a shareholder could communi-
cate to his or her broker, or via software, that he or she is only will-
ing to purchase a stock with a certain minimum level of disclosure 
across the various categories. This would prevent the need for share-
holders to always read the actual nondisclosure policy, while still ac-
complishing the goal of having shareholders’ preferences reflected in 
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the policies. At the same time the menu contract would be relatively 
straightforward and would not resemble the sort of lengthy legalese 
privacy policies that consumers receive and disregard all the time,217
such that a shareholder who did choose to read the policy should be 
able to understand it with relative ease.       
C.   Potential Secondary Benefits 
 Furthermore, it is possible that this entire regime would not only 
better reflect existing privacy and disclosure preferences, but could 
also change social behavior regarding privacy. In advocating for a 
contractual approach to online interpersonal privacy, Patricia 
Sánchez Abril notes that the contractual system could allow individ-
uals to communicate expectations of privacy to each other and poten-
tially “recontextualiz[e] the online social space as one where people 
[have the option to] value privacy.”218 Abril views contract as having 
the power to both express and create social norms and to combat the 
“anything goes” environment that generally exists when it comes to 
privacy.219 If Abril is correct, then allowing individual executives to 
negotiate for privacy-disclosure policies can create a social norm in 
which it is acceptable to maintain some aspects of one’s life private 
even if one chooses to be a corporate executive.220   
 This ability to contract for increased privacy, and the shift in 
norms that may accompany it, could have a beneficial impact on the 
prevalence of women and minorities in corporate positions. It is wide-
ly recognized that women and minorities are underrepresented  
as executives of publically traded corporations.221 A wide variety of 
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theories have been offered to help explain this continued glass ceil-
ing, and undoubtedly there are a number of complex factors at 
play.222 One possibility worth exploring in future work is whether 
privacy preferences play a role in this disparity. There are some rea-
sons to believe that women and minorities may be more privacy-
protective than white men.223 Perhaps, then, among the complex fac-
tors involved in a world in which executives cannot contract for pri-
vacy and the ability to guarantee individual privacy is uncertain, 
women and minorities are less likely to pursue the top-level corpo-
rate positions, in which their privacy is likely to be compromised. 
Although this remains speculative, the impact of privacy concerns on 
women and minorities’ abilities to reach top executive positions is 
worth further consideration. 
D.   Comparisons with a Sorting Regime 
 A contract-based regime like the one proposed necessarily has 
transaction costs associated with the contracting process itself. Alt-
hough the contractual menu design of the proposal deliberately seeks to 
minimize those contracting costs, they cannot be eliminated entirely.   
 In other contexts in which there are heterogeneous preferences, 
the conventional response is to suggest that individuals sort them-
selves based on their heterogeneous preferences.224 Therefore, it is 
worth considering whether a similar sorting regime might make 
sense for the heterogeneous privacy preferences faced by corporations 
for their executives. It might be possible to design a system in which 
corporations would unilaterally decide on their disclosure policies. 
Executives could then sort themselves into the corporation whose 
disclosure policy best fits their privacy preferences.   
 Although such a regime is possible, as with any sorting solution,225
it too would have associated costs. First of all, there are reasons to be 
particularly concerned as to whether sorting would work efficiently 
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in the market for corporate executives. Unlike housing, in which 
there are generally properties available in different neighborhoods at 
any given moment, high-level executive positions are extremely rare, 
especially at a given moment. Therefore, even if they desired to do so, 
executives might not be able to sort among corporations with various 
disclosure policies, but would often be faced with an all-or-nothing 
proposition. Second, as with other complex decisions,226 executives 
make decisions based on a multitude of factors, such that privacy 
would be bundled with numerous other relevant considerations. This 
would also limit the ability of executives to adequately sort based on  
privacy preferences.   
 Finally, there might be additional costs associated with such sort-
ing even if it did occur. For example, a lower-level executive with ex-
perience in a particular company might otherwise be promoted with-
in that corporation to a high-level executive position (sufficiently 
high to necessitate disclosure). If that executive’s privacy preferences 
did not match that corporation’s disclosure policy, the executive 
might be forced to sort away to a different corporation, even though 
the executive’s institutional knowledge would mean it would ordinarily 
be more efficient for the executive to remain within the original com-
pany. A contract-based solution would allow the corporation to retain 
that executive by negotiating an individualized disclosure policy.   
IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE PROPOSAL
 Allowing corporations and executives to contract for a tailored 
nondisclosure policy in combination with mandating disclosure of 
that nondisclosure policy would better address the privacy-disclosure 
balancing problem than traditional legal solutions. This section antic-
ipates questions regarding the extent to which this conclusion is gen-
eralizable to other related situations, and considers the circumstanc-
es under which disclosure of nondisclosure policies might work as a 
feasible substitute for disclosure of underlying facts.   
 Although similar privacy-disclosure problems occur in many con-
texts, at the outset, contracting only makes sense when both parties 
have sufficient bargaining power to believe that the contract can ad-
equately reflect the interests of both parties. Therefore, unlike corpo-
rate executives, a similar model would likely not make sense in an 
ordinary employment contract for ordinary employees who lack such 
bargaining power. Furthermore, contracting only makes sense where 
there is a market with sophisticated parties who can act on the dis-
closed disclosure policies. In the context of corporate executives, insti-
tutional investors and other sophisticated shareholders play that role, 
leading to a closer approximation of an efficient market assumption. 
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In other contexts where this sort of problem arises, such as a few 
mentioned below, other types of solutions need to be developed.  
A.   Distinguishing the Consumer Context 
 The idea of using disclosure of disclosure policies does exist in oth-
er areas involving privacy problems, although in a very different way. 
For example, Michael Froomkin proposes that “all sites that collect 
personal data [be] required to disclose what they collect and what 
they do with it.”227 This is the inverse of the proposal presented in 
this Article. In Froomkin’s scenario, the question being answered by 
the disclosure policy is what information will be collected and when 
that information will be disclosed to others, where such disclosure is 
mostly bad from the consumer’s perspective. In the scenario here, the 
point of disclosure of the disclosure policy is actually disclosure of non-
disclosure—or informing shareholders what information will not be 
disclosed where disclosure is viewed as largely positive from the share-
holders’ perspective. Despite these differences, both ideas use similar 
mechanisms combining legislation, market forces, and the litigiousness 
of Americans to attempt to strike a proper balance by making it an 
actionable offense to violate a posted privacy/disclosure policy.228
 Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that disclosure of the 
applicable disclosure policy may work better in the corporate execu-
tive disclosure scenario than in the consumer context.229 There are 
concerns with allowing individual consumers to negotiate the level of 
privacy or disclosure that they desire due to various market imper-
fections.230 Many of these concerns, however, do not apply to negotia-
tions between sophisticated executives and corporations. Two of the 
main concerns with relying upon a privacy market in the consumer 
context—lack of bargaining power and lack of privity of contract—have 
been eliminated in the executive context. Unlike consumers or ordi-
nary employees, executives typically have plenty of bargaining power 
and leverage, and are therefore in a position to fairly contract for 
their desired terms. Additionally, the corporations and executives are 
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already at the bargaining table negotiating various aspects of the 
employment arrangement, so there is no concern with a lack of privity.   
 There is also a concern in the consumer context with the lack of 
knowledge on the part of consumers regarding the treatment of per-
sonal data. For example, in the medical privacy context, Paul 
Schwartz notes that there are three factors contributing to the failure 
of the privacy market: (1) lack of knowledge regarding the treatment 
of personal data; (2) an agency problem; and (3) a collective action 
problem.231 The lack-of-knowledge concern would be ameliorated in 
the executive context by using the very requirement of negotiating 
for a disclosure policy as a means of making executives fully aware of 
the possibility of disclosure of their personal information. As opposed 
to the shallow consent process in the medical context, which relies on 
blanket patient release forms,232 the proposal here requires active 
negotiation of an individualized policy, therefore raising issues of 
awareness, informed consent, and possible compensation for disclo-
sure of personal information.233         
 With regard to the potential agency problem identified by Schwartz 
in the medical context, here too the shareholders’ disclosure interest is 
imperfectly represented by the corporation at the negotiation table.234
The disclosure of the nondisclosure policy is an attempt to minimize 
the agency problem by providing a mechanism to hold corporations 
accountable to the extent that disclosure policies vastly diverge from 
the shareholder preferences.   
 Finally, in the consumer context there is a collective action prob-
lem because “[a]s members of large consumer blocks, individuals may 
have difficulty finding effective ways to express collectively their rel-
ative preferences for privacy.”235 The solution offered here is precisely 
designed to help executives express their respective privacy prefer-
ences relatively cheaply, which is made possible by the fact that the 
parties already have contractual privity. Therefore, many of the con-
cerns in the consumer context with contracting for and adopting a 
disclosure of the relevant disclosure policies can be avoided in the 
corporate executive context.      
B.   Distinguishing the Political Context 
 Perhaps the most obvious contender for an analogous situation is 
the question of how to treat the disclosure of private information 
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about political candidates and elected officials.236 Currently no law 
requires political candidates or elected officials to disclose infor-
mation about their health.237 Many candidates do decide to voluntari-
ly release information about their physical health, although others 
have outright lied about their health status.238 There are, however, 
state and federal election commission rules that require candidates 
for office to make various types of financial disclosures.239     
 Numerous similarities exist between the political disclosure con-
text and the executive disclosure context. Just as shareholders have a 
legitimate interest in knowing information that could impact the per-
formance of corporate executives, voters and citizens have a legiti-
mate interest in knowing information that could impact the perfor-
mance of elected officials.240 Additionally, both executives and politi-
cal candidates necessarily give up some rights to privacy as a result 
of their decision to pursue their careers of choice, although certainly 
neither group entirely gives up all privacy rights.241 Similarly, there 
have been concerns expressed that a perceived lack of strong candi-
dates for elected office is a direct result of the invasion of privacy that 
comes along with running for office.242 Scholars have recognized that 
increasing the potential for maintaining some privacy would mitigate 
these high costs of running for public office, resulting in an increase 
in the pool of qualified candidates, and perhaps also a higher degree 
of excellence in government.243 In other words, there is a concern that 
if privacy preferences are heterogeneous, that limitation of the pool of 
politicians to those with very low privacy preferences impacts the 
quality of candidates.
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 Furthermore, in a world in which the government and its elected 
officials increasingly make policies about the privacy of ordinary citi-
zens, there may be a social harm to the privacy of all individuals that 
occurs when politicians are limited to the portion of the population 
who do not highly value privacy. Similar to the concern about corpo-
rate executives, who also make a good deal of privacy policy,244 having 
elected officials solely from a self-selected pool of low-privacy individ-
uals may result in a lesser priority on privacy in general, as a result 
of a lack of understanding of “what the privacy fuss is all about.”245
 Despite all of these similarities in the problem, key differences 
prevent any recommended applicability of the solution proposed 
above to candidates for elected office. The political context is missing 
some notable features necessary to make the solution work in the 
corporate context. One major difference is that the disclosure of per-
sonal information that could impact the performance of elected offi-
cials is more important during the campaign, when voters need to 
make an informed decision, than during the term of office itself. Un-
like shareholders, who can continue to buy and sell stock at any time 
and therefore need continuous information, voters do not continuous-
ly vote on the performance of elected officials outside of the context of 
elections. This suggests that the timing of the solution needs to be 
different, and the treatment of personal information about candi-
dates for office (some of whom may currently be in office) should be 
different from personal information about already-elected officials. 
 A corollary of this difference is that the mechanisms involved in 
getting candidates elected greatly differ from the mechanisms in-
volved in hiring an executive. Most importantly, there is no immedi-
ate parallel to the negotiation process in which the executive and 
corporation negotiate over various aspects of compensation. Instead, 
candidates for elected office run for office knowing in advance the 
terms of the job for which they are running. The details of that job 
are non-negotiable. Furthermore, much of the disclosure of infor-
mation results from media scrutiny and the unraveling effects of dis-
closure by other candidates, rather than any legal requirement for 
disclosure. For example, during the 2012 U.S. presidential election 
Mitt Romney found himself forced to reveal some aspects of his tax 
returns after repeated calls by other candidates for him to do so.246     
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 In view of these differences, any attempt to draw lessons from the 
executive and privacy balancing solution offered in this Article must 
properly take into account the particular challenges of the political 
context. This is not a one-size-fits-all proposal. The proposal present-
ed in this Article offers one way of addressing one particular incarna-
tion of a privacy-disclosure problem by taking advantage of features 
of the corporate disclosure system: (1) sophisticated parties who can 
engage in informed contract negotiation; (2) existing sophisticated 
investors who have the time and resources to update the market in 
light of new information; (3) mechanisms and institutions for pricing 
complex information; and (4) empowered shareholders who have 
proven themselves willing to sue in order to enforce the disclosure 
system. Any similar proposal in the political context would have to 
take advantage of existing institutions in the political realm, which 
are very different from the institutions and mechanisms in the corpo-
rate context. For example, rather than mandating some sort of specif-
ic regulated disclosure before a candidate could receive federal 
matching funds for his or her campaign, as others have proposed,247
the law could mandate that candidates disclose their nondisclosure 
policy in order to receive federal matching funds for the campaign. 
Then if the candidate failed to disclose promised information, or, 
more importantly, flat out lied about promised information, the rem-
edy would be that the candidate be forced to return those funds, 
which were conditioned on good faith compliance with an agreed-to 
disclosure policy. It is true that the increased likelihood of an unrav-
eling effect in the politician arena might require high levels of disclo-
sure; however, at the very least this would create certainty for every-
one involved with regard to disclosure, and offer a remedy in re-
sponse to the clear problem of candidates lying about information. 
Furthermore, this system would allow candidates to agree to protect 
the privacy of children or other family members, as there might be 
wider agreement that the children did not choose to enter the public 
sphere. Alternatively, policymakers could consider leveraging the po-
litical party system and the possibility of contracts with those parties 
to create the sort of balance of privacy and disclosure made possible 
in the executive context by virtue of the contract relationship.             
V. CONCLUSION
 This Article has suggested that new solutions are needed for the 
disclosure of personal information about corporate executives. The 
status quo lacks clarity, fails to account for both privacy and dis-
closure interests, and removes the possibility for executives to opt 
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out of the regime to tailor a disclosure policy that better fits their  
privacy preferences. 
 As one possible solution for addressing the competing interests of 
privacy and disclosure, policymakers should supply menus of optional 
disclosure policies. Executives and corporations should contract for 
the particular disclosure policy that would apply to that executive’s 
personal information. The corporation should then be required to dis-
close the disclosure policy to the shareholders. This combination would 
improve upon the status quo by increasing clarity, while allowing  
for differences in policies that can reflect heterogeneity in executive  
privacy preferences.   
 Returning for illustrative purposes to the most salient example of 
the problem, despite his notoriety, by all accounts Steve Jobs was an 
extremely private individual even prior to his diagnosis. Consequent-
ly, under the proposed disclosure-of-disclosure-polices regime, Jobs 
would likely have contracted for a disclosure policy that would have 
protected a fair amount of his personal information from disclosure. 
Thus, when he became sick, Apple would not have needed to agonize 
over whether to disclose his information. It could have consulted the 
applicable disclosure policy as to whether health information about 
Jobs needed to be disclosed. Similarly, shareholders would have al-
ready known that Jobs had a disclosure policy in which certain types 
of information would not be disclosed. All parties would have had far 
clearer expectations, and Jobs’ privacy preferences could have been 
accommodated. This illustrates the way the proposed solution should 
work not only for Jobs, but also for less famous executives and corpo-
rations facing the privacy-disclosure problem.  
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